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VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 870241-CA 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent agrees with Appellant's statement of the case 
except as to the facts set forth hereunder: 
1. At the time that the parties were married, Respondent 
had completed his premedical training and the first year of 
medical school. (Finding of Fact number 8; hereinafter "FF #8"; 
located at Appendum TAB 8, hereinafter "TAB 8"). The Court also 
found that Respondent "would have achieved a medical degree with 
or without the Plaintiff's limited contribution" (FF #12; TAB 8). 
Appellant has a college degree from Weber State College (Trial 
Transcript: page number 3; hereinafter "TT; 3"). 
2. During the portion of medical school completed after the 
parties' marriage, Respondent received a grant of approximately 
$400.00. During his third and fourth years, he contributed 
approximately $150.00 per month as earnings from a part-time job. 
During that same time, his parents paid for all of his books and 
tuition. Appellant provided the remaining support needed by the 
parties, but such support hardly made her the "sole supporter of 
the family" during those three years (Appellant's Brief, p3). 
1 
3. From June, 1970, until the trial in March, 1987, a 
period of nearly seventeen years, Respondent was the sole 
supporter of the family. The family enjoyed an affluent 
lifestyle as a result of his practice from 1974 until the time of 
the trial (TT; 5). 
4. The actual assets divided at the trial amounted to 
nearly $910,000.00, excluding Appellant's unsatisfied claims for 
"excess earnings", the value of the "medical license" and the 
inflated value of the corporation stock (Conclusions of Law #15; 
hereinafter "CL #15"; as adjusted)1. Essentially all of the 
tangible property was divided by Stipulation as were the cash and 
financial accounts (TT; 7). Including what the Court awarded her 
as one-half the value of Respondent's medical practice, 
Appellant received nearly $456,000.00. Of that, $140,000.00 was 
equity in real and tangible personal property, leaving 
$315,927.00 in cash, stock, and securities. At trial, Respondent 
testified that, using the proceeds of Appellant's settlement to 
pay off the mortgage on the home, and based upon a projected 
pension and profit sharing distribution to Appellant of 
approximately $193,000.00 (rather than the $228,372.00 which was 
actually distributed to her), and after deducting the penalty for 
withdrawal of income generated within the pension and profit 
sharing plan and taxes, Appellant would have additional income, 
based on an eight percent rate of return, in excess of $1,500.00 
per month from the liquid assets, without ever touching the 
principal received in her settlement or any of the tangible real 
and personal property (TT; 186, 187). In addition, her expenses 
would have been reduced by the $330.00 per month which she had 
aIn Appellant's Brief, page 27, Appellant chose improperly 
adjusted figures to purportedly reflect the final distribution at 
the end of the corporation's fiscal year. The correct figures 
are shown on Conclusion of Law #15, except that Plaintiff's share 
of the pension trust is increased to $228,372.00, making the 
adjusted total $455,927.00. The total cash was $59,602.00, 
giving Plaintiff liquid assets having a value of $315,927.00 and 
tangible real and personal property having a value of $140,000.00. 
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allocated for the house payment (TT; 187 Ln 18, FF #15 figures; 
TAB 8). Utilizing the figures for property which she actually 
received, and an 8 percent rate of return on the liquid assets, 
and deducting the tax penalty for withdrawing the income from the 
pension and profit sharing plan, Appellant would receive 
$23,447.18 per year as return on her property, or nearly 
$2,000.00 per month.2 
5. In addition to the above referenced property, Appellant 
claimed to be entitled to one-half of a greatly inflated value 
placed upon Respondent's medical practice with Associates of 
Pathology, Inc. However, the Trial Court found Appellant's 
expert witnesses "lack credibility" (CL #4; TAB 8), and found 
that Respondent's experts had "high credibility regarding the 
value of Defendant's interest and stock in Associates of 
Pathology . . . ." (CL #5). The record contains an abundance of 
evidence which supports the Trial Court's conclusion regarding 
Appellant's witnesses, such as the following: 
A. Mr. Merrill is not an economist (TT; 61), and he 
admitted that he had drifted away from day to day accounting 
activities during the recent years (TT; 59). 
B. In analyzing the data on his own chart, prepared 
for his client, he could not answer questions on direct 
examination as to the meaning of a percentage shown on the chart 
(TT; 69). 
C. In determining the value of the medical license as 
opposed to a Bachelor's degree, he utilized the figure 
$129,560.00 as the 1987 income for the average pathologist 
nationwide (TT; 80). When Respondent was provided the same 
document on rebuttal, he testified that the 1982 figure in the 
document (from which the 1987 estimate had been derived) was 
$120,000.00 per year rather than $107,000.00 (TT; 228). When 
^Calculations at 8 percent interest on $87,555.00 cash and 
securities, and the $228,372.00 pension and profit sharing trust 
to which the 10 percent penalty was applied in the calculations 
yields $23,447.18. 
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Respondent extrapolated that figure at the rate purportedly 
utilized by Mr. Merrill, 9.4 percent, he estimated that the 1986 
to 1987 average annual salary should have been $184,000.00, not 
$129,560.00 (TT; 229). 
D. During his testimony Mr. Merrill admitted that he 
had no idea whether pension and profit sharing benefits were 
included in the national figures for pathologists1 income (TT; 
96). When pressed, he stated that he would have to refer to his 
book, but never did so (TT; 90). On the other hand, Respondents 
expert Mr. Crouch testified that it was very unlikely that those 
figures would include pension and profit sharing sums as the 
figures are not generally so reported by the institutions (TT; 
144). As a practical matter, government agencies and many larger 
corporate employers do not reflect pension benefits as part of 
the compensation package. 
When asked whether the pension and profit sharing proceeds 
could be allocated between the parties during the divorce action, 
Mr. Merrill and his associate were not even aware that the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (Ferraro Bill) requires allocation 
of private pension and profit sharing proceeds to spouses when so 
allocated by a Decree of Divorce (TT; 112). Mr. Crouch corrected 
this misconception early in his testimony (TT; 139, 140). 
E. Mr. Merrill projects Dr. Johnson's income at an 
unrealistic rate utilizing a base line figure that is 
significantly distorted by events in the recent past. 
Specifically, he projects the income growth rate at 9.58 percent 
per year (TT; 85) in spite of the fact that he admitted on cross 
examination that the actual historic growth rate for Associates 
of Pathology, including recent distortions, had been 
approximately 6.8 percent during the corresponding period and 
that physicians' earnings in general were decreasing (TT; 102). 
He presented no data to the Court to substantiate using the 
growth rate of 9.58 percent. 
P. Mr. Merrill totally disregarded the income 
depressing factors testified to by Drs. Johnson and Hammond. Dr. 
4 
Hammond testified that the income for the previous two years had 
been abnormally high because Dr. Wahlstrom had not been a full 
partner during those years, and thus had received only 13 percent 
of the total income during 1985 and 20 percent of the income 
during 1986, while the remaining three partners split the excess 
between them (TT; 117 and 124). Additional factors entered into 
evidence to show why Respondent's income was decreasing include: 
1. During 1983 Dr. Eason had become disabled; 
The remaining three physicians had carried the load for four 
physicians and had divided the income by three for that and 
succeeding years until Dr. Wahlstrom's entry into the practice 
(TT; 117). 
2. That 70 to 75 percent of the entire income for 
the corporation was generated from St. Benedict's Hospital which 
was experiencing significant cutbacks in its overhead (TT; 121). 
For example, the position of Medical Director, which at one time 
had paid $72,000.00 per year into the corporation had been 
reduced to $60,000.00 in 1985, $40,000.00 for 1986, was expected 
to be reduced to $1,000.00 per month for 1987, but would probably 
drop to zero as of May 1, 1987 (TT; 125, 126). 
3. Medicare and Medicaid programs were cutting 
back on what was paid for various procedures, and the projection 
was that there would be significant further reductions (TT; 122). 
As a result, Dr. Hammond testified that income for the current 
year would be between $122,000.00 and $127,000.00, with an 
absolute maximum $130,000.00 per principal (TT; 124), not the 
$180,000.00 figure utilized by Mr. Merrill in his testimony (TT; 
46) nor the $190,000.00 figure argued by Appellant in her Brief 
(Ap Br; 15). 
4. Health maintenance organizations and the 
increase in the number of doctors available throughout the 
country had resulted in significant reductions in doctor's 
incomes (TT; 131). 
After hearing the above testimony, the Court then valued the 
stock in accordance with the Restrictive Stock Agreement which 
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contractually binds the stockholders at the present time, and 
which bound the associates at the time that these parties 
purchased their stock and Respondent became a principal in the 
corporation (TT; 118 Ln 8-13). 
6. Appellant also claimed to be entitled to one-half of the 
value of Respondent's medical license, which her expert testified 
was worth $1,156,426,000 (TT; 92 Ln 5-13). Appellant's expert, 
in establishing the proffered value based the calculation on 
speculative future income, projected from a starting income which 
was substantially distorted in the recent past because of the 
several unusual but explainable occurrences described above by 
Dr. Hammond which were not likely to be repeated (TT; 83-86; 117; 
124). In addition, Appellant's expert totally disregarded the 
numerous occurrences which had recently taken place, or were 
presently in progress, which clearly indicated at best a leveling 
of corporate income at approximately $122,000.00 to $130,000.00 
per year per partner, (TT; 124; 126; 206) or more likely a 
significant decrease in each partner's future income (TT; 117; 
121; 122; 124; 125; 126; 131). The Trial Court disregarded the 
proffered value and held that "Defendant's medical degree should 
not be marital property subject to division by the Court in a 
divorce action" (CL #6; TAB 8). 
7. Next, Appellant claimed entitlement to one-half of a 
hypothetical sum referred to as "amounts of money and 
distributions that were incurred after the date of separation . . 
. . " (TT; 70 Ln 20). In essence, the expert claimed that the 
income which Dr. Johnson earned during the pendency of the action 
should be utilized to pay to Appellant $3,200.00 per month for 
support of herself and the family (TT; 24 Ln 9-17), and that she 
should be awarded as property an additional sum essentially equal 
to one-half of everything else that Respondent earned during that 
time frame. Mr. Merrill did reduce that sum by estimated amounts 
paid for taxes or deposited in the joint bank accounts and 
otherwise divided pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties 
(TT; 70-74), but disregarded Respondent's testimony accounting 
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for the entire amount (TT; 176-178), The sum claimed was 
$45,220.00 (TT; 74). The expert stated that these calculations 
were based upon interviews with Mrs. Johnson (TT; 71 Ln 25) and 
that he did not know that the funds actually existed. He 
admitted that they may have been spent or might have been 
misunderstood, but felt that they were "unaccounted for . . . ." 
(TT; 71; 74; and 205 Ln 4-8). When then asked whether he felt 
that Dr. Johnson's testimony regarding what had been done with 
the money satisfied his "accountability", he admitted that he had 
not followed the testimony nor been able to reconcile that 
testimony with what he had shown as being "unaccounted for" (TT; 
205 Ln 13-25). In actuality, Dr. Johnson accounted for all of 
the 1986 and 1987 bonus payments which were the basis of 
Appellantfs claim (TT; 176-178). The Trial Court was able to 
reconcile the figures and found that Appellant 
" . . . should not be entitled to any portion of 
Defendant's 1986 or 1987 bonus inasmuch as these are 
considered as part of Defendant's overall annual 
income, provided, however, that such portions of 
Defendant's 1986 bonus as were previously allocated to 
the various savings and checking accounts of the 
parties and formed a part of the Stipulation of the 
parties should not be affected" (CL #13). 
In conjunction with this provision, the Court further ordered 
that Respondent be responsible for any federal and state income 
taxes owed as a result of his 1986 income (CL #14; TAB 8). 
8. The Trial Court awarded Appellant $1,000.00 per month as 
alimony for a period of ten years, or until otherwise terminated 
by law (CL #8). In addition, she was awarded child support for 
three children totalling $1,944.00 per month (CL #3) for a total 
of $2,944.00. In her testimony, Appellant repeatedly affirmed 
her earlier claim in her Affidavit (Ex #7D; TAB 1) that she 
needed $3,200.00 per month in order to maintain the standard of 
living to which she and the children had been accustomed (TT; 
7 
24). The amount of child support, alimony and a conservative 
estimate of the rate of return on the liquid assets which she was 
awarded, after deducting withdrawal penalties, yields a total 
monthly income of nearly $5,000.00 (TT; 24; 167; 186-187). 
Realistically evaluating the needs which she claimed in her 
Affidavit and at trial, the court could clearly find that she 
could maintain her current standard of living with substantially 
less than the $3,200.00 per month. (TT; 25 at Ln 3; Ln 11-19 and 
TT; 169). In his testimony, Dr. Johnson testified that during 
the marriage those same expenses, excluding the $330.00 house 
payment, had been approximately $2,200.00 per month (TT; 169; Ex. 
13D; TAB 2). In addition, Respondent testified that he still 
would be paying for the "big ticket" items such as the children's 
college, marriages and missions (TT; 165 Ln 14-22; 183 Ln 12). 
He testified that he had recently taken his children and their 
friends to Sun Valley for a weekend (TT; 179), that he took his 
son to Mexico with him for two days (TT; 180) and that he was 
planning to support his son on a mission in approximately a year 
and one-half (TT; 186 Ln 8-16) . The parties had already funded 
separate accounts for each of the children during the marriage 
with approximate balances of $16,000.00 each. Respondent 
testified that he intended to continue funding these accounts 
with approximately $500.00 per month (TT; 165). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN 
RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL LICENSE. 
A. A medical license is not a property asset 
allocable under the provisions of Section 30-3-5, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), or under the Common 
Law. 
B. Plaintiff has been adequately compensated for 
efforts expanded while Defendant was attending 
medical school by enjoying a high standard of 
living during more than fifteen years of post-
training marriage, by receiving a property 
settlement of nearly one half million dollars, and 
by receiving substantial alimony and child support 
awards. 
C. Defendant would have obtained his degree without 
financial assistance from Plaintiff. 
D. Appellant's expert testimony as to the value of 
Respondent's medical degree was not credible and 
was thus properly disregarded by the Trial Court. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS AND DECREE ABSENT A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. The Trial Court is permitted considerable 
discretion in distributing assets and liabilities. 
Its determination should not be disturbed absent a 
clear abuse of discretion, a manifest injustice or 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error. 
B. The Trial Court distributed the marital assets 
fairly and equitably based upon specific Findings 
of Fact and substantiated by the record. 
C. Appellant !s evidence as to disputed property 
valuations was not credible and was thus properly 
disregarded by the Trial Court. 
POINT III 
THE T R I A L COURT WAS WITHIN I T S DISCRETION IN 
DISREGARDING APPELLANT'S EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO THE 
VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S ON-GOING MEDICAL PRACTICE. 
Appel lant 1 s expert testimony was not cred ib le and 
was based upon highly specu la t ive and f a c t u a l l y 
erroneous data. 
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B. A p p e l l a n t f s e x p e r t w i t n e s s c o n t r a d i c t e d h i s own 
a s s u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e p u r p o r t e d e x c e s s 
e a r n i n g s upon which h i s v a l u a t i o n of t h i s a s s e t 
was based . 
C. A p p e l l a n t ' s v a l u a t i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 
c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s o f t h e 
s h a r e h o l d e r s o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n i n w h i c h 
Respondent p r a c t i c e s . 
D. A p p e l l a n t a t t e m p t s t o i m p o s e upon R e s p o n d e n t an 
a s s e t a t a v a l u e w h i c h i s t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h t h e v a l u e w h i c h R e s p o n d e n t i s b o u n d b y 
c o n t r a c t t o o b t a i n i f he s o l d t h a t i n t e r e s t . 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS ADEQUATE TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO 
MAINTAIN THE STANDARD OF LIVING TO WHICH SHE HAD BECOME 
ACCUSTOMED DURING THE MARRIAGE, WAS BASED ON 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND WAS WELL WITHIN 
THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
A. The al imony and c h i l d support awarded t o Appe l lant 
n e a r l y meets the amount which she r e q u e s t e d , and 
e x c e e d s the amount which she cou ld demonstrate a s 
b e i n g n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n t h e p r e - s e p a r a t i o n 
s tandard of l i v i n g for h e r s e l f and the c h i l d r e n . 
B, In s e t t i n g t h e a l i m o n y award , t h e T r i a l Court 
i m p l i c i t l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e income p o t e n t i a l 
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POINT V 
available to Appellant from the property award of 
nearly one-half million dollars. 
C. The Trial Court considered all of the factors 
considered to relevant determining alimony, with 
the possible exception that no future income was 
imputed to the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
D. Appellant1 s evidence as to Respondent's current 
and expected income, from which the alimony award 
was derived, was not credible. 
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
ADEQUATE AND PROVIDES THE CHILDREN WITH A STANDARD OF 
LIVING COMPARABLE TO THAT ENJOYED DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
A. The most credible evidence as to Respondent's 1987 
income was that it would range between $122,000.00 
and $130,000.00, and there was a high probability 
that it would decrease during the coming years. 
B. The child support guidelines in the Second 
Judicial District are advisory and not 
controlling upon the Court but in this case were 
followed. 
C. In Setting the child support, the Trial Court 
correctly acknowledged Respondent's significant 
ongoing contributions toward "Big Ticket" items 
12 
for the c h i l d r e n made during the marriage and 
planned for a f ter the d ivorce . 
POINT VI 
THE ADDITIONAL $45,200.00 SHARE OF RESPONDENT'S INCOME 
WHICH APPELLANT CLAIMS WAS ACCUMULATED WHILE SHE 
RECEIVED SUPPORT UNDER THE TRIAL COURTfS TEMPORARY 
ORDER DOES NOT EXIST. 
A. The amount which Appellant received as temporary 
support was exactly what she requested as 
necessary to maintain her standard of living, and 
substantially exceeded the pre-separation monthly 
expenditures for the entire family. 
B. While Appellant continued her lifestyle at or 
above her prior standard of living under the 
Temporary Order, Respondent was left with $699.00 
per month (after taxes) and was forced to live 
with his parents during the ten months of the 
case. When he did receive his bonus, all but 
$8,000.00 was put into various accounts that were 
split at trial and used to pay joint debts of the 




APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INTEREST IN 
RESPONDENTS MEDICAL LICENSE. 
Utah case law is clear concerning whether a supporting 
spouse is entitled to an interest in an advanced degree. As 
found by the Trial Court, Respondent "would have received a 
medical degree with or without the Plaintiff's limited 
contribution" (FF #12). The Court of Appeals in Peterson vs. 
Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 at 242 (Utah App. 1987) held that a 
medical degree is not property to be equitably divided between 
the spouses. The Court ruled that where the marriage has been 
long, 
" (t)he contributions and sacrifices of the 
one spouse in enabling the other to attain a 
degree have been compensated by many years 
of a comfortable lifestyle which the degree 
permitted. Traditional alimony analysis 
works nicely to assure equity in such cases". 
Id. at 242 footnote 4. 
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Peterson logic in 
Rayburn vs. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 at 240 (Utah 1987) in holding 
that "an advanced degree or professional license is not marital 
property subject to division upon divorce." The Trial Court's 
award of $45,000.00 to Mrs. Rayburn as her share of Dr. Rayburn1s 
medical degree was re-characterized as rehabilitative alimony. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Gardner vs. Gardner, 73 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 at 38 (Utah 1988) affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals in 
holding that where "the marriage is of long duration, present 
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earnings and business assets provide a more accurate measure of 
the true worth of the wife's investment in her husband's degree." 
The spouse who sacrificed while the other spouse earned the 
degree "realized greater benefits from the medical degree in the 
form of a greater property settlement and higher alimony.11 Where 
the marriage has been long and assets are sufficient, the degree 
and medical practice need not be valued at all. Ld. In the 
Gardner case, the Court considered $250,000.00 to be a 
substantial property award. 
In the case at bar, Mrs. Johnson enjoyed the fruits of the 
medical degree while she was supported for more than fifteen 
years from Dr. Johnson's residency until the parties separated in 
January of 1986 (TT; 18, 69). She received a property award of 
$455,927.00, $315,927.00 of which was capable of producing 
current income (CL #15 and Appellant's Brief 27. Note: 
Appellant is in error; the $59,602.00 cash award was not reduced 
to $42,602.00). Thus Mrs. Johnson received approximately twice 
the property award which the Gardner Court found adequate to bar 
an excursion into the realm of valuing the doctor's medical 
license. Gardner, page 38. 
If the Court were to consider a reversal of the common law 
set forth above, then for the reasons set forth in Respondent's 
Statement of Facts, paragraphs 1 through 8, the evidence which 
Appellant presented was based upon such poorly founded 
assumptions and speculation that the Trial Court was correct in 
dismissing it with a summary that "Plaintiff's expert witnesses 
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lack credibility regarding the value placed on Defendant's 
interest and stock with the Associates of Pathology and regarding 
the value of his medical degree" (CL #4). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS AND DECREE ABSENT A CLEAR 
AND SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Trial Court is permitted considerable discretion in 
distributing assets and liabilities and its determination should 
not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion, a manifest 
injustice or a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error. See Pusey vs. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 at 119 (Utah 1986), Turner vs. Turner, 649 
P.2d 6 at 8 (Utah 1982), Penrose vs. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 at 
1019 (Utah 1982), Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 at 1222 
(Utah 1980), and Alexander vs. Alexander, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 at 
32 (Utah 1987). The policy of the Utah Supreme Court is to 
affirm the Trial Court's decision whenever it can do so, even if 
the Court has to use different reasoning than that used by the 
Trial Court. Jesperson vs. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 
1980). 
The party appealing a Trial Court's division of marital 
property has the burden of proving that the Trial Court's 
findings are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence. 
Berger vs. Berqer, 713 P.2d 695 at 697 (Utah 1985). See also 
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v s . S e a r l e , 52 2 P . 2 d 69 7 a t 700 ( U t a h 1 9 7 4 ) . 
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 r * ^ r , . - ,M . * ^ i V J l j x d *p* b a s e d 
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c o u n t r y , anc *•» -u ' f p r o j e c t i< n s w (* i -*. . m o n i r t . j . *t <*r;ich 
i s t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w u i i <* e v i d e n c e a s t o b o t h t n - ' e n t 
y e a i dim IIUIIIIM y e a r s ' e x p e c t s . i n c o m e s (TT- R/*) X "M c s ^ a t i v e 
a r e h i s u s e o1 a p r o j e c t e d i ncome g r o w l ' s r a t e f o r A s s o c i a t e ^ o f 
Pathology of 9.58 percent per year (TT; 85) in spite of the fact 
that he admitted on cross-examination that the actual growth rate 
for the company, including recent distortions, had been only 6.8 
percent per year, and that physicians1 earnings in general were 
decreasing (TT; 102). His capitalization of earnings dependent 
on services of a single individual at five times his 
(erroneously) projected income is totally inconsistent with 
reasonable business valuations, particularly in light of his 
concessions that there should be a discount for "lack of 
marketability" and the fact that the position is a minority 
rather than control position in a corporation (TT; 87, 89). For 
these factors he discounts a total of 30 percent, in spite of the 
fact that Dr. Wahlstrom, in an actual arms-length transaction, 
had recently discounted his factor by 100 percent by purchasing 
his interest for a figure that included no "excess earnings" (TT; 
142) . 
"The weight and credibility of the witness, including expert 
testimony, and evaluations of property are matters to be 
determined by the trier of fact." Yelderman vs. Yelderman, 669 
P.2d 406 at 408 (Utah 1983) citing Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District vs. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). See also 
Turner vs. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 at 8 (Utah 1982). 
The transcript in this case is replete with inconsistencies 
which undermine the credibility of Appellant's expert witnesses. 
Clearly the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
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d i sregarding that evidence and basing i ts decision c • n 11: ie 
evidence presentee >•- Respondent and I lis witnesses. 
Appellant he burden of demonstrating an abuse 
of discretion, misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, a 
manifest injustice o; • * •. * ii n l IM r Any 
property award that q K e , ^- , p<*r *> iie-.v.' nl the assets is 
equitable upon its face absent a showing otherwise (Fletcher vs. 
Fletcher » "hi i I il I M M MM ili I MHUI I , While the1 re is no 
fixed * .•*"• . -r « < hrt^  msiderable discret , r, ;n 
ci»w:. fiina m^v~. i^: p»- .pertw awards ui m- ) smaiier perc- -:FS 
1 •: - * npr^rp^ :rt See Gramme vs. 
Gr a m m e , 58 7 * *; * ?; :< '* where 
Plaint i n • s awara * -i -»r t y 
was upheld; Turner vs. Turner, 64l * -J * !* r, where 
the Court I lpheld an award of betweer "i P*** ' e m diw 4*. percent 
depei id11 Ig c i : w 1 Iose • ^  '"a 11 iatioi i wa 3 beI Iev<= 'd ; Berger vs. Berger , 713 
P. 2d 695 at: 699 (Utah 1 985) \ rl lere the Court upheld the wife's 
award ml 60 percent nf the mai'ital assets where tl :ie wife earned 
mi'iri* 1 han I lie (HIS band, and Savage v. Savage, 65 8 P 2d 1 201 at 
12 04 (Utah 1983), where the wife's award of 40 percent of the 
marital assets was upheld. 
Tin* "J i iaj l our! distributed the marital assets fairly and 
e q u i t a b . y -aseu upen s p e c i f i c f i r>,1 -.
 (,r * fa J w; were 
substar " - , i ne 
Appellate Court ^H^^J,^ n. • s .;.- u s t u n ; * §e .r a: ^ojri ^ 'Hidings 
and decree. 
POINT IH 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISREGARDING APPELLANTS EXPERT TESTIMONY AS 
TO THE VALUE OF RESPONDENTS ON-GOING MEDICAL 
PRACTICE. 
In awarding Mrs. Johnson one-half of the value of 
Respondent's medical practice with Associates of Pathology, the 
Trial Court utilized the valuation based upon credible evidence 
presented by Respondent's expert witness. As defined by the 
Articles of Incorporation and the Stock Redemption Agreement 
which were in effect when Dr. (and Mrs.) Johnson joined the 
corporation in 1972, this valuation provides that an associated 
interest in the corporation is defined as his portion of the 
value of the equipment, the cash on hand, and the accounts 
receivable less accounts payable (Ex 9D, Para 4; TAB 3). The 
corporation has no intrinsic value other than the earnings of the 
respective associates, particularly since under the terms of the 
agreement a stockholder forfeits all rights in the corporation, 
except as provided by the definition of his "interest" at the 
"end of four month's continuous absence from the business for any 
cause" (Ex 9D, Para 1; TAB 3). The award was based upon credible 
evidence, and was well within the discretion of the Trial Court. 
In fact, contrary to the Supreme Court's definition in Dogu 
v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 at 1309 (Utah 1982), the Trial Court in 
following the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement included 
more assets in the valuation than was necessary. In Dogu the 
Appellant/wife was awarded assets equal to the value of her 
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11 I P e t e r s o n v s . P e t e r s o i i ' 2 4 3 (1I1 a 11 A pp . 
1 9 8 7 ) , a p p e l l a n t w a s a w a r d e d r, <= e n 4 , : - p r o f e s s i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n 
because his anticipated income from the medical practice was 
considered in the alimony award to Mrs. Peterson. 
Based on these cases, it is clear that both the Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court have rejected the concept of 
capitalized income flow as a means to value a personal service 
business in which the income from that business is totally 
dependant upon the future personal services provided by an 
individual. Appellant's expert relied to a great extent on 
exactly such a capitalization, using speculative and highly 
suspect data in forming his valuations. 
In capitalizing Dr. Johnson's earnings to determine a value 
for his practice, Mr. Merrill uses five years' income, based on 
the distorted recent history of the corporation. Utilizing Mr. 
Merrill's figures would put Dr. Johnson in the? untenable position 
of having assessed against his share of the divorce proceeds a 
five year capitalization of the same earnings which would be 
providing the child support and alimony, paid in advance and 
based on highly speculative assumptions. This would be in spite 
of the fact that upon withdrawal from the corporation he would 
receive nothing for any such capitalization that his wife had 
been awarded. 
In explaining the four methods which he has utilized to 
value the various aspects of Dr. Johnson's practice, Mr. Merrill 
acknowledges the fact that the four methods utilized lead to four 
different valuations (TT; 91, 141). In his testimony, Mr. Crouch 
pointed out that in valuing Dr. Eason's one-fourth of the 
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corporatioi i, Mi • Merri11 had uti1ized f ive d I f ferent valuat ions, 
I: ! lis 
case jeternijriii.j ««.| ..son t :e-ioi.f 'ii u terest the 
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it tne vaiues aerivea oy Liie various metnoas aia not come out 
relatively close, then som.eth.ing was wrong with the vali lation 
process (XI; 141) 
In i!i|»cij i s n i i I M i Mm i"! i I | ' « 11 11111 I / i j \ 11»' i in II, it i v e r i n d 
e r r a t i c testiir^r. * >JU -\ systeir.dti, ri. .\ analyzes various 
p r o b l e m s with + r^ <r • rw~- projection* j- . -se p -d 1 r . • He 
a * *r - j . n r.e 
majori tv c ' , *: serv i re* . K S I . Benedic ' -, * s^rur ; t > the 
income position is greaiiy reduceu [ii; isoj. Inis wouia ear,y 
be substantiated by Dr. Hammond's tPs-Mmony that the *^ ' i« io 
t - -orpn-
 ; . • associated • - Medical Directorship had 
c: . i :. - 3 
tririf tnree y e a r s i ?1 1 2 5 , 1 2 6 ) . 
]-- adfi ; M •* ^r-—.w !: points nu* thsr there :s ': excess 
: •. i . ••. i **_ * - t - - . - • , 
a .i . earning?- are arawi- out anr, pai = i r •  ^  rour K^ct " s in 
annual basis. He states that the concept of "excess income11 i lpon 
w h i c hi M in Mer r l at tempts to es tab J Ish a signi f i cai it vali le for 
the corporation does not even apply ii I these circumstances (TT; 
14 3 ) . 
In analyzing Mr. Norman's data, Mr. Crouch testifies that 
many of the projections utilized in those calculations were based 
upon figures relating to hospitals and health maintenance 
organizations, and thus were not appropriate to valuing a 
specific practice in Ogden, Utah (TT; 145). 
Mr. Crouch testified that the preference for determining the 
value of a company was to first take data from that specific 
company. The next best choice would be to use data from similar 
businesses within the same area. The least reliable choice would 
be to use national averages (TT; 146) . He then provided the 
Court with an example from his own experience of two different 
medical practices in Ogden, Utah, of two specialists in the same 
specialty, one of whom earns $40,000.00 per year net, and the 
other earns $200,000.00 per year net. He advises that it is 
impossible to merely average the earnings, since such procedures 
disregard professional abilities of the specific doctor, the 
personal efforts expended, the personal efficiency and the 
personal ability to attract business. In utilizing national 
figures, the personalization necessary for accuracy in valuing 
the professional practice is just not possible? (TT; 146, 147). 
Mr. Merrill's valuation also disregards the basic contract 
principle that all four stockholders in the corporation have a 
contract right to the value which they hold, and which is 
derived from the earnings which they contribute to the overall 
income of the corporation. Until and unless that contract is 
dissolved or declared void, a party could not change those terms 
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some such value and remove it from, tl le corporation at the expense 
of the other joint venturer or tl le othei principals ii i the 
c orpora t ioi I . 
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producing his "share" of the income, he will receive none. The 
shares of stock in the corporation do not entitle him to 25 
percent of the income merely because he owns the shares. If he 
cannot produce he will be in the same situation as Dr. Eason, the 
withdrawing partner who is no longer able to practice. In other 
words there is no good will value to the practice other than what 
he is currently earning, plus inventory, equipment and accounts 
receivable, which the Court included. The value of Respondent's 
share of the corporation was thus correctly placed at $14,521.00 
by his witnesses (TT; 156). To attach a value greater than this 
would clearly prejudice Respondent by making him pay to Appellant 
a portion of his future earnings, based upon highly speculative 
projections, and then require him to pay alimony and child 
support based upon the earnings as they are finally received. 
If the future income turned out to be much less then projected, 
as is likely in light of the testimony at trial, then he would be 
paying her a substantially greater percentage of his earnings 
then would have been intended by the Court. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS ADEQUATE TO ALLOW 
APPELLANT TO MAINTAIN THE STANDARD OF LIVING 
TO WHICH SHE HAD BECOME ACCUSTOMED DURING THE 
MARRIAGE, WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD AND WAS WELL WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
On appeal, the Court should fashion its own remedy only 
where the Trial Court has abused its discretion. Unless the 
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the Trial Court here properly analyzed Appe] lant's alimony award 
under thp M.rrM farlorr i i t eci ^nes vs . Jones , 700 1 • .2d 1072 
at 1075 (Utah 1985). [See also Gardner vs. Gardner, 73 1 Ital I Ads 
Rep. 35 at 3R (Utah 1988) , and Rayburn vs. Rayburn 738 P 2d 238 
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E a m e s , _ < ?d 39 •- a t ^ 7 . U t a h A£-fc * - v / ) The t emporary 
support award which Appellant proposed, and to which Respondent 
acquiesced without change, provided her the requested $3,200.00 
per month. Mrs. Johnson testified that she felt $3,200.00 would 
give her "the things I had always had" (TT; 24 and 32. See also 
Ex. 7D, pages 2 and 3; TAB 1). This included paying a $330.00 
monthly mortgage (TT; 24), saving $500.00 per month to buy 
Appellant a new car every two years (i.e. $12,000.00 plus a two 
year-old trade in available every two years) (TT; 25, 34), house 
repairs and upkeep in the amount of $308.00 per month (TT; 25; 
26; 33), car insurance at $156.00 per month (TT; 34), and 
recreation and travel at $669.00 per month (TT; 33). After 
analyzing these requests in light of Respondent's testimony as to 
historical costs of $2,200.00 plus a $330.00 mortgage payment 
(TT; 169; Ex 13D; TAB 2), the Court found that the parties had 
actually spent less while he was in the home than was provided 
for under the Uniform Child Support Schedule for the Second 
District based on Respondent's income (FF #28). The Trial Court 
then awarded Appellant $1,000.00 in alimony and $1,944.00 as 
child support (CL #8 and #3). 
In addition to the $2,944.00 monthly income, Mrs. Johnson 
received $455,927.00 in assets, $315,927.00 of which was cash and 
income-producing assets (CL #15, as corrected when the property 
was actually distributed based on the then current amount in the 
pension trust). As set forth in the Statement of Facts, 
paragraph 4 above, a conservative return on those liquid assets 
of 8 percent yields nearly $2,000.00 per month additional income 
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income generated by her property award, which she will receive 
whether or not she remarries, is adequate to insure that she will 
never have to work (TT; 167). 
In analyzing the third criteria, the Court carefully 
analyzed the testimony regarding Respondents current income, 
the business climate for his practice, and the factors impacting 
his future income (FF #20, 21, 22). These earnings and his 
future potential earnings were considered by the Court in fixing 
the alimony amount. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Gardner vs. Gardner, 73 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (Utah 1988), citing Jones vs. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 at 
1075 (Utah 1985), says that the purpose of alimony is to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living and maintain the 
standard enjoyed during the marriage. Respondent's net monthly 
income from his salary is $3,899.00 per month until supplemented 
by his bonus (TT; 158). During the pendency of the divorce, he 
was forced to live with his parents because he could not afford 
rent or a mortgage payment on the $699.00 which was left to him 
after the payment of the temporary support (TT; 160). With the 
current alimony and child support obligations, he will have 
approximately $955.00 per month available until such time as he 
receives his bonuses, which depend entirely upon the income 
earned by the corporation during the preceding fiscal period (TT; 
116). In order for Respondent to live in a house comparable to 
the house awarded to Appellant, he will have to pay considerably 
more than the $330.00 monthly mortgage payment that Mrs. Johnson 
30 
w i , paying *• • * : il- nr- paying trave, in: >— r-*-** u 
jji..t^ d tha- -uiiiiS'-jfi ^ p r o p o s a i =*w-*-d eq-ja": amour r^ -
Appellan •» ; Respondent T ^  -*M tea* »f• •> <-rr + rav«-. r^ iur new 
cdi pm - - .p ; :isi^: +-H^ *- she 
needed substantial 1^ more tia:> those s-m;- s /* '% his 
Exhibit 14D, based i ipoi i a proposed * * -. • M O 
Appellant for chi Id support (a--: . : : i.u y ^ est imated a 
requirement of $6,750.00 per month as his living expenses. 
Adjusting !: I: I I s * • r e for the - / 
a w a r d e d *-• Appellan* leaves uiir, wi** r*~* m---.* ' . \ dpf i' it of 
approximately $650.0 " H i <~ budget also includes ronti^ua + of 
1 - • .-•.-* . . , :^ • , ipproximate I v $b00,i>0 per 
month into * children's (.-iirje education, marriage and mission 
f u n d s -'"' - * - - uHc u i 11-1ci J. L;onta i i ied a] 11i r< J y i rma t i I / 
$ : * • • . 
The support award Mrs. Johnson is ortualiv higher than 
awards to other spouses ^ - ; 
Court H)H'I tH» Utah Supreme Cm.-t, Appear:; ^ites- Peterson vs. 
Peterson, Yelderman vs. Yelderman H 'n Savage vs , Savage for hIs 
prnpusil ii»n I li.il Mf ' Inlnr MM 1' -J •( * . i*> a; i roximatel^ 73 
percent below the average nt the M -ee ca^e^ (Appellant's Brief 
p26J I i tat t , in Peterson vs. Peterson, 7 37 r . 2d ^ i vutah App. 
^The exhibit shows an excess of expenditures over income but 
in actuality reflects a surplus using the original figures, The 
deficit noted here is based upon an adjusted bottom line for 
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estimated taxes included thereon. 
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1987), after re-characterizing her property award as alimony, 
Mrs. Peterson was awarded $2,000.00 per month in alimony, 
terminable upon remarriage. However, Mrs. Peterson received only 
$11,000.00 in cash and income-producing assets and owed a monthly 
mortgage on her home of $1,600.00 (Peterson Trial Brief of 
Appellant plO) . Mrs. Peterson's property award was in no way 
comparable to the $455,927.00 which Mrs. Johnson received; the 
income Mrs. Peterson could expect from $11,000.00 of assets would 
be less than $75.00 per month compared to nearly $2,000.00 per 
month that Mrs. Johnson's estate can generate. Mrs. Peterson's 
$1,600.00 mortgage in no way compares to Mrs. Johnson's $330.00 
mortgage, and is nearly equal to Mrs. Johnson's total reasonable 
monthly expenses (FF #28). Furthermore, upon remarriage, the 
bulk of Mrs. Peterson's income (other than child support), will 
cease. Upon remarriage, Mrs. Johnson will still have $1,944.00 
per month child support and the nearly $2,000.00 per month 
investment income without depleting her $455,927.00 estate or 
converting any of the real or tangible personal property into 
income producing assets. 
In Rayburn vs. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987), Mrs. 
Rayburn was given $750.00 per month alimony for five years, and 
$56,850.00 in retirement assets which were re-characterized as 
alimony for tax deduction purposes. This compares as a small 
fraction of the $228,372.00 which Mrs. Johnson received as 
retirement assets. Other aspects of the Rayburn property 
settlement were not reviewed on appeal. 
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In Yelderman vs. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983), Mrs. 
Yelderman received $2,500.00 per month alimony but had a $950.00 
monthly mortgage and received only 44 percent of the marital 
property, apparently none of which was capable of producing 
income. In addition, Dr. Yelderman had not paid the mortgage 
during seven months of separation. 
Appellant also cites Savage vs. Savage, 658 P. 2d 1201 (Utah 
1983). Mrs. Savage received $2,000.00 per month in alimony. She 
had enjoyed household help and gardening services during the 
marriage, which were not part of the Johnson family standard of 
living either before or after the separation. Mrs. Savage 
received by stipulation $243,827.60 in marital property which 
included her own savings accounts (a gift), securities, her 
personal belongings, the value of which was not itemized, and 40 
percent of the stock in Savage Companies. The Savage court held 
that the $3,500.00 per month in total income available to Mrs. 
Savage and her three children was not "manifest injustice". This 
is nearly $1,500.00 per month less than Mrs. Johnson has 
available to her and three children, and Mrs. Savage had a 
significantly higher standard of living before the separation 
than did Mrs. Johnson. 
Obviously, comparing one high income divorce case to another 
using one factor in isolation, such as alimony, is meaningless. 
The Court must look at the total property and maintenance award, 
in light of the Jones criteria. Here the Trial Court took all of 
these factors into account, made findings and conclusions based 
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upon credible evidence, and made an equitable support order 
integrated with a substantial property award. 
POINT V 
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IS ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE THE CHILDREN WITH THE 
STANDARD OF LIVING COMPARABLE TO THAT ENJOYED 
DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
Child support should be adequate to maintain the standard of 
living that the children enjoyed during the marriage. Savage vs. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 at 1205 (Utah 1983). The Johnson children 
have lived in a home with a $330.00 monthly mortgage, had skied, 
water skied, vacationed in the family cabin and in condominiums 
and had gone three-wheeling (TT; 216). Mrs. Johnson was awarded 
the boat to continue water skiing with the children, the cabin to 
continue vacationing there and the three wheel motorcycle (FF 
#15, p7; TAB 8) Respondent was awarded no comparable recreational 
items. Mrs. Johnson also testified that three children had taken 
piano lessons, one had taken dance lessons, and all three 
children want to take tennis lessons (TT; 116). In Mrs. 
Johnson's itemization of the amount she considered necessary to 
continue the family's lifestyle, she proposed the amount of 
$669.00 per month for travel (TT; 33 and Plaintiff's Affidavit re 
Temporary Support, Ex. 7D; TAB 1) as part of the $3,200.00 which 
she requested. She testified that this amount would be adequate 
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to allow herself and the three children to continue their trips 
(TT; 222). 
The Trial Court found that the amount of child support 
provided on the top increment of the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule (Second District) for three children was more than the 
entire family had spent for its standard of living while 
Respondent was living in the home (FF #28 and Memorandum Decision 
#5). In arguing that the child support was insufficient, Mrs. 
Johnson's only substantiation of an alleged increase in need was 
that the price of ski tickets has risen (TT; 220) and that every 
driver in the home needed a car. She has purchased an $8,000.00 
car for her 16-year-old son and anticipated doing the same when 
the next child became a driver (TT; 217-218). Regardless of 
whether every child should now have an $8,000.00 automobile, the 
pre-separation lifestyle that the family was accustomed to did 
not include automobiles for the children. 
In addition to the child support of $1,944.00, each child 
has $16,000.00 in an individual savings account to use for 
college, a mission, and a wedding (TT; 165). Dr. Johnson 
anticipates spending a substantial portion of his budget on 
travel and recreation when he takes the children on vacations 
(TT; 164, 222), and he plans to continue depositing approximately 
$500.00 per month into the "Big Ticket1* accounts (TT; 183). 
Although it is not particularly meaningful to discuss child 
support in isolation, since Appellant argues that the Uniform 
Child Support Schedule should not include a ceiling at the 
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$120,000.00 per year gross income level, Respondent offers the 
following cases to illustrate approved child support awards in 
high income divorce cases. In Peterson vs. Peterson, 737 P. 2d 
237 (Utah App. 1987), Dr. Peterson earned over $100,000.00 per 
year. The District Court awarded child support in the amount of 
$300.00 per month per child for six children or a total of 
$1,800.00. Under the Uniform Child Support Schedule, Dr. 
Peterson would have been ordered to pay $407.00 per month per 
child for a total of $2,442.00. The amount of child support was 
not made an issue on appeal. In Rayburn vs. Rayburn, 738 P. 2d 
238 (Utah App. 1987), Dr. Rayburn was ordered by the District 
Court to pay $400.00 per month per child for each of three 
children for a total of $1,200.00. Based on his income of 
$125,000.00 per year, under the Uniform Child Support Schedule, 
he would have been assessed $648.00 per month per child for a 
total of $1,944.00 at the schedule ceiling of $120,000.00. The 
child support was not an issue on appeal. In Dogu vs. Dogu, 652 
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), Dr. Dogu was ordered by the District Court 
to pay $200.00 per month for the support of one child. Under the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule, at an income of $108,675.00, Dr. 
Dogu would have been ordered to pay $1,078.00 for that child. 
Child support was again not an issue on the appeal. 
Child support was appealed in Savage vs. Savage, 658 P. 2d 
1201 (Utah 1983). Mr. Savage was ordered to pay $500.00 per 
month per child for each of three children for a total of 
$1,500.00. At an income of $133,370.00, under the Uniform Child 
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Support Schedule ceiling he would have paid $648.00 per child for 
a total of $1,944.00. The District Court's award of $1,500.00 
child support was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Again, it is clear that the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion. In fact, the Court's finding that the $1,944.00 
child support exceeded what was actually spent by the parties 
while Defendant lived in the home reflects that the Court was 
generous in making that award and appropriately considered 
Respondent's ongoing contributions to the children in their 
recreational activities, travel and particularly in relation to 
the savings function associated with the "Big Ticket11 items made 
possible by an income level at or above the top bracket of the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule. Furthermore, Appellant's 
argument regarding the use of the child support schedule is 
inconsistent as it is the very discretion of the Trial Court 
which is the crux of her argument. Here the Court used the 
discretion in limiting the child support rather than following 
her extrapolation of the amounts beyond the $10,000.00 per month 
income level. 
Finally, the Trial Court's capping the schedule at the 
$10,000.00 per month level is consistent with the policy 
recommendation of the Child Support Task Force which is presently 
preparing Uniform Child Support guidelines for the State of Utah 
under the direction and supervision of the State Judicial 
Council. (See Draft Policy Statement, 2-10-88, page 6; TAB 6). 
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POINT VI 
THE A D D I T I O N A L $45,200.00 SHARE OF 
RESPONDENT'S INCOME, WHICH APPELLANT CLAIMS 
WAS ACCUMULATED WHILE SHE RECEIVED SUPPORT 
UNDER THE COURT'S TEMPORARY ORDER, DOES NOT 
EXIST. 
A. The amount which Appellant received as temporary support 
was exactly what she requested as necessairy to maintain her 
standard of living and exceeded her pre-separation monthly 
expenditures by approximately $1,000.00 per month (TT; 169). 
B. The parties had stipulated to the division of all of the 
existing assets at the commencement of the trial, as they then 
existed (TT; 170-178; Exhibit ID; TAB 10). The Trial Court found 
that the Appellant "should not be entitled to any portion of 
Defendant's 1986 or 1987 bonus inasmuch as these are considered 
as part of Defendant's overall annual income". Inasmuch as the 
1986 bonus was "previously allocated to the various savings and 
checking accounts of the parties and formed part of the 
Stipulation of the parties," that part of the bonus should remain 
as already divided (CL #13; TAB 8). 
In fact, the bonuses which Appellant is claiming somehow 
still exist included $81,000.00, half of which was received 
before the separation and was already included as a part of the 
property division. The $40,000.00 received after the separation 
included $26,000.00 deposited in the Merrill Lynch ready asset 
account which was divided and $4,000.00 paid for tithing. Of the 
final $21,580.00 bonus, $1,000.00 was used for a loan which was 
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included in Respondent's one-half of the property division, 
$426.00 paid for Federal Income Tax preparation, $211.00 paid 
car insurance for Appellant's automobiles, $560.00 paid one life 
insurance premium, over $12,000.00 was paid as estimated 
quarterly tax payments and Dr. Johnson made various philanthropic 
contributions as usual (TT; 177-179). After paying the temporary 
support from his wages, Respondent had only $699.00 per month 
left for his own expenses, (TT; 160) so some bonus money was 
necessary to satisfy some of his own living expenses TT; 170, 
195) . 
Appellant's expert admits that the mythical $45,200.00 that 
was supposedly not allocated may well not be "somehow sitting in 
a fund someplace in its present form. It's just an unaccounted 
for portion of earnings for that period" (TT; 74). He admitted 
"that a substantial amount of that is not really going to be 
available to either Dr. Johnson or Mrs. Johnson because there are 
other calls . . . on those earnings" (TT; 71). He admits the 
money is unaccounted for but might not exist. The funds "may be 
spent, they may be misunderstood, but at this point, they are 
unaccounted for . . . ." (TT; 205). 
Of the 1987 $30,000.00 bonus, $6,000.00 went to pay 
estimated taxes, $4,000.00 was used to make up 1986 taxes, 
$3,000.00 went to charity, and $7,000.00 went into the 
Continental Bank account that was listed as an asset and had 
fallen below the $20,000.00 stipulated to (TT; 170). Appellant's 
expert estimated the taxes on the income at 28 percent rather 
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than the actual 35 percent rate which Respondent was paid (TT; 
70, 158). Some of the bonus money had to be used for 
Respondent's ongoing living expenses and some was part of the 
income upon which child support and alimony were based (TT; 195). 
Finally, to further undermine Mr. Norman's credibility, he 
testifies that the salary upon which his calculations were made 
is what he "believed" had been paid to Dr. Johnson for the first 
two and two-thirds months of 1987. There are no facts in 
evidence, no discovery as to those sums, nor any testimony on 
that point in the trial (TT; 76). 
When further questioned as to whether or not he had heard 
Dr. Johnson account for the "unaccounted for monies", Mr. Norman 
admitted that he had not followed, and had not been able to 
"reconcile" the accountability (TT; 205, Ln 13-206 Ln 3). He did 
however, admit that he had been present in court when Dr. Johnson 
had testified, item by item, as to the amounts that were 
disbursed from his checkbook (TT; 206, Ln 7-11). 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the transcript and the record before the Court, 
it is clear that the Trial Court heard and weighed the 
credibility of the testimony, made appropriate Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law consistent with the credible evidence 
presented to him, and based the Decree on all of these relevant 
factors. His alimony award took into account the sums to be 
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provided for child support, Respondent's income and expenses, the 
large property award conferred upon Appellant and its significant 
income-producing potential, viewed in light of Appellant's 
reasonable needs to maintain her pre-separation standard of 
living for herself and the minor children. There was no abuse of 
discretion, no manifest injustice, no misunderstanding of the 
law, nor any misapplication of the law resulting in any 
substantial or prejudicial error. Pursuant to the line of cases 
cited under Point II of the Brief, the decision of the Trial 
Court should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this fh day of February, 1988. 
NEIL B. CRIST 
NELDA M. BISHOP 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to counsel for Appellant via 
first-class mail, postage prepaid on this /a? day of February, 
1988: 
Stephen W. Farr 
Farr, Kaufman and Hamilton 
Bamberger Square, Building I 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
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Bamberger Square, Building 1 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-5526 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, ) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
- v s - ) AND AFFIDAVIT 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, ) civil No. ^/Y737 
Serve defendant : 1332 Marilyn Drive , Ogden, Utah 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT . 
You are hereby ordered to appear before the Hon. DAVID E. ROTH ^ 
one of the Judges of the above-ent i t led Court , on the _4 th f l o o r o f the 
County Courthouse, Ogden, Utah, on the 19tfr jay of F e b r u a r y , 1986 , 
at the hour o f 9 :45 O'clock
 a m., then and there to show cause, i f any 
you have, why you should not pay to the ( p l a i n t i f f ) (KKKSflJOUpC such sums as 
may be found to be reasonable fo r temporary al imony, temporary support money, 
and temporary a t to rney 's fees during the pendency of these proceedings: and 
why you should nut be res t ra ined from d i s p o s i n g o f any o f m a r i t a l a s s e t s 
d u r i n g t h e pendency o f t h i s p r o c e e d i n g . 
and why temporary custody of the minor OOGjtXjdt ( ch i l d ren ) should not be 
temporarily awarded to (plaintiff) (JtKSSfKtoOX). You are further hereby ordered 
to b r i ng wi th you to c o u r t , copies of your 1982, 1983, and 1984 income 
t a x r e t u r n s , and r eco rds of your earn ings to da t e in 1985, i nc lud ing 
a i l bonues, and a s t a tement of any bonuses r ece ived to da te in 1986V an< 
e s t ima ted f u t u r e bonuses for 1986. 
The claims of the ( p l a i n t i f f ) (j&JtodiSXBtk and the r e l i e f prayed fo r are 
p a r t i c u l a r l y described in the a f f i d a v i t , a copy of which is attached he re to , 
and is hereby served upon you. 
DATED t h i s ^P day o f ^ Tammry J , 19 85 
1RM A (page n 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss . 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
The undersigned states: 
That the amounts here ina f te r set f o r t h are reasonably necessary to 
maintain myself and my (sdXMXtfc ( ch i l d ren ) during the pendency of these 
proceedings. 
U t i l i t i e s , water , l i g h t s and garbage . . . . . $ 245.44 
Heat, gas or o i l or c o a l , e tc , . * ^ . . . $ 169.24 
.Rent or home payments S 455 .00 
F i re Insurance S 20 .00 
Dent is t S 12 .25 
Drugs, vitamins, e t c / * 1 ? * ? 8 , h ad -p ro fe s s iqna1 courtesy.)
 m m $ 10.00 
Hospital Insurance, etc. (paid by. employer.) 5 
Car Expense S 156.00 
Reoairs and upkeep . . / T ^ ^ T - S 308 .00 
Food . ( ^ e l u d i n g . s c . h 9°l lungh) S 346.00 
Clothing £n.d . h a i r c u t s $• 250.00 
L i f e Insurance $ j T - £>Y 
Union Dues $ 
Recreation $ 669 .72 
Child Care $ 
other . fn?w. c.ai: ?v.ei;y. tyo. 7e?r?> s 500.00 
FORM A (page 3) 
PAYMENTS ON DEBTS: (xRS&lffii (monthly) OWED TO: 
Amer i can G e n e r a l Mor tgage Company $ 330.40 
Family Income: 
I am employed by unemployed 
My take-home pay is $ - 0 - per (week) (month) 
Other income from none in the amount o f S ~ 0 -
The (defendant) (jKSXXXXKff) is employed by A s s o c i a t e s o f P a t h o l o g y 
(Defendant) (XXXX$K#X# has other income in the amount of S 
Family Assets: 
I own seperate property as fol lows ( rea l or personal) : 
Value S 
I and the (defendant) (p l a in t i f f ) j o i n t l y own the following oroperty: 
Rea l p r o p e r t y , v e h i c l e s , r e t i r e m e n t a c c o u n t , bank a c c o u n t s , M e r r i l l Lyr 
a c c o u n t s , f u r n i t u r e , f u r n i s h i n g s and o t h e r Value S Unknown 
p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . 
The (defendant) (tffolXKKfcfifil owns property as fol lows ( rea l or personal ) : 
Value 5 
I hereby swear that the foregoing is true and cor rec t . 





ESTIMATED MONTHLY INCOME - MRS. JANET JOHNSON 
Child support from Dr. Johnson 
Return on investments & savings 
Cash $51,911 + 
Stock 18,644 ca 8% 
Return on Pension Plan - $183,950 @ 8 1 
less J 0 % p e n a 11 y & t axes 
E s t: i in a t e d i n: i : • i I 1 1 i J ;> e x p e i I s e s - M r s . J a r l e t J o I i r i son 
Utilities 
Heat, gas, coai 
Fire Insurance 
Dentist 
Vitamins & drugs 
Car expense inc. 
Repairs & upkeep 
Food, including school lunch 
Clothing & hair cuts 
Life insurance 
Recreation 
Other (new car every 3 i r s.) 
Proper t y tax o i i home 
$ 2100.00 





2 4 5 . 
169 . 























. 0 0 
$ 2195.89 
Excess of estimated inconv over expenditures $1406.00 
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Stockholders, \ _ _. 
an\ 
u u t \ / u i i i pU i ijr 
rHEREFORE AGREED: 
. i: _.. _:. -: -..y Stockholder at an^  time 
desires to sell, encumber, or otherwise dispose of any of his stock of the 
Company, or if any Stockholder shall terminate his employment by the 
Company, he shall offer all his stock to the Company at adjusted book value 
(determined as provided in Paragraph 3 ) , by written notice addressed to 
the principal office of the Company. 
A Stockholder shall be deemed to have terminated his employment 
at the end of four (h) months continuous absence from the business for any 
cause, and shall be deemed to have made written offer of his stock to the 
Company at the expiration of such period, excluding absences with the 
permission and consent of the Company. Within thirty (30) days after 
receipt of such offer, the Company may deliver written notice of acceptance 
of such offer to the offering Stockholder at his residence, fixing a 
closing date for the purchase of the stock not more than thirty (30) days 
thereafter, or, alternatively the Company may within such period 
deliver written notice to the offering Stockholder that it is being 
dissolved and liquidated. If the Company elects either of these courses, 
the offering Stockholder shall vote and take any other necessary action 
in accordance with the vote of the remaining Stockholders (or, if 
there is more than one remaining Stockholder, the Stockholder or 
Stockholders owning a majority of the remaining voting stock), so as to 
effectuate the will of the Company. It is expressly stipulated, however, 
that the Company shall have the right not to pursue either of these 
courses, in which event the offering Stockholder may dispose of his 
stock to any other qualified purchaser approved by the Company free of 
the restrictions of this agreement: or, alternatively, he may call a 
me'"* * l ie S toc i u ~ • ' ' " r r . i - - - - w i m i n * j 
C'I j f "c: i tf i Is pui pose . 
Deo lli ui j i U L . k l I ( J 1 d t . J I , II I I !| II I III I U j i I  I  1 I  I I I  III II i I III I I I I I  
S t o c k h o l d e r s w h i l e own i mi sh i i . k i n 1 he ( .ompan/ , the Company sha l l ! L 
d i s s o l v e d u n l e s s if, s k i l l e l i r f f o pu rchase at ad j us f ml hook values 
u i dUinn d i o f b u i m e <'- Ji j r e i n a T t e r c a i i e 
rep resen t a 11 ves , and t o t he daceden t ' s s t i r v i v I ng v •r '• • *-
(6 0) d a y s a f t e r a p p o i n 11 n e i 11 o f such p e r s o n a l r e p r e s c - t c s 
e v e in in t 11 ! e C o i i i p a i i ; e 1 e ::::: I: s t o p i 11 c I  i a s e 11 i 5 s 1: o c I :, o ill " 
sun vi vl i ig widow, it si iall fix a closing date 1 tot rv * i- -
days a f t e r i t s g i v I n g o f 11 1 e f o r e g 01 n g 1 1 o 11 c e , a 1 1» - p ^  - r 
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o b l i g e d t o s e l l t h e i i s t o c k 01 1 t he t e r n is hen " e i n a f t e . r o v l j - j 
pe rsona 1 r e p r e s e n t a t i ves o f t he deceased Stoc I ;.ho 1 m- - / * 
v i ::! o ' s 1 1 a "II "II • 1 o I: e 31 i ::) t a I : • 2 a 1 1 ; • o t II 1 e 1 1 1 e c e s s a 1 ) a c t 
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Company. 
3. Free Transferability of Stock. A Stockholder may transfer 
all or any portion of his stock to any person qualified by the Articles of 
Incorporation to be a stockholder; provided, however, that the Stockholder 
desiring to transfer all or any portion of his shares first shall advise the 
Company of the proposed transfer and the price offered for the Stock. 
Prior to any such sale, the Company shall have the option to redeem the 
said stock at the same price offered by the proposed transferee. If 
said option is not exercised by the Company within fifteen (15) days 
after notice to it of the proposed sale, the Stockholder shall be free 
to sell said stock to said transferee. 
A. Purchase Price. For the purpose of Paragraph 1 and 2 above 
the adjusted book value of all the stock of the Company shall be an amount 
computed as follows: 
An appraisal of all Company assets at the $ x x x x x 
date provided for herein, shall be made 
by an independent certified public 
accountant, including accounts receivable 
at 85% of their stated amount and cash 
value of any insurance policies, but 
excluding any goodwill reflected on the 
books of the Company. In appraising 
accounts receivable consideration shall be 
given to the length of time they have been 
outstanding and to the amount of expenses 
necessary to collect said accounts. 
LESS: All Company liabilities x x x x x 
ADJUSTED VALUE OF ALL STOCK $ X X X X X 
Ad j i is t ed boo! : va 11 ie sh a 1 1 be compu t:cd as of the c l o s e of 11 ie 
month p r e c e c I i i i g 11 i e d e a 11 i * ' " 11 o c k If i o I : f e r o i t h e d a t e o f t h e o f f e i p r o v i d e d 
f o r In i P a r a g r a p h "II, as tt le c •-.e may be , 
A d j u s t e d book v a l u e i "I I b e f i i r n I s I i : :! t o t: I1 i e i i 11: e r e s t e < i p a i I: I e s 
i n a s t a t ^ m o n f " P r e n a r e d by t .. o m p a; i y , s r e a u 1 a r a c c o u n t a n t ; a n d s u c 1 \ 
s t a t e m e n t T re c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e Company, the p a r t i e s and t h e i r • 
pei ! I i e s . 
Payment of P u r c h a s e Pjr 'ce Payment of the p u r c h a s e p r i c e t o 
t o c k f i o 1 d c: i i" in i 11 i e c I 1  c u rn s t a n c e s 
prov'i" ' - p a r a g r a p ^ ••- v - shall be made as follows: 
vd/ in ^ a ' p u i c h a ^ • r Pa rag rap! i 1. at the options of 
n o a n y either _: n p sum o r i 11 i \ = :: 1 o s I1 i g o i o i i e - 1 1 111 I ("II 3 ) s I i a 1 1 
'
%c ,: • j "* ' ( *'" c 11 i ' • • • t h e C o m p a n y , t h e b a 1 a n c e I n t w o ( 2 ) 
equal n ( -
 L e r e S L D eann 1 11 i : e i 11: s p a) a b 1 : s I x (6) i n c i 111 i s = i i • ::l 
•"w^l"* months respect iv ely , af tei the clos Ing ; payment must be made 
( lb ) III i in c a s e a ill " a p t i in • ::: I i a s i \ i i d •• * i P a i a g i a p 1 i 2 , t 
s h .i 11 b e p a I d a t "I: I \e c 1 o s I n g f I x e d b \ t: I ie Company 11 i a . io t 
t o exceed f i v e (5) equa l r ion I n t e r e s t bear ii tg I n s t a l l m e r * -
p a y ab 1 e a t I: I le c 1 c s 11 i g ai i d s i i :::: c e e d i i i g 11 i s t a "il "I i i le i 11 s p a • > a , , 
t w e 1 v e ( 1 2 ) ,. e i g h t e e t t (1 8 ) , a i i d t \ / e i \ t y -1 " o u i ( 2 k) m o n t I i s a f t e r s i i c h 
c l o s i n g . 
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t o put cl lase i t s s t o c k , t h e Company and i  t:s o f f i c e r s and s t o c k h t T -
s h a l 1 pi ompt ly t a k e a l 1 n e c e s s a r y s tep" t o r e d u c e the c a p i t a l s t o c k 
o f 11 i e C o i I I p a i i) t o 11 i e e x t e n t i e q u i" r e d , 
6. Obligations Pending Payment. Pending full payment of the 
purchase price as provided for in Paragraph h above: 
(a) The sellers or their personal representatives shall deposit 
their stock at the closing with an excrow agent of his, or their choice, 
deliverable against final payment. 
(b) The Company's policies and operations shall be governed by 
the following: (l) the nature of the Company's business will not be 
altered, and such business will be conducted and property will be sold, 
and commitments made, only in the ordinary course; (2) no dividend or 
other distributions will be declared or paid; (3) the level of 
compensation paid employees or officers shall not be increased unless warranted 
by increased business. 
(c) Annual financial statements prepared by the Company's regular 
accountants shall be submitted to the selling Stockholder, or the estate 
of the decedent, until the full purchase price is paid. 
7« Endorsement on Stock Certificates. During the continuance of 
this agreement, all stock certificates of the Company shall bear an 
endorsement as follows: 
nThis certificate is held subject to the terms of an 
agreement, dated the 2 5 t h d a Y o f February 1977 , a 
copy of which is on file at the principal office of the 
Company in Ogden, Utah. 
8. Arb? tration. Any controversy arising under this agreement 
shall be settled in Ogden, Utah, by arbitration under the rules then 
exi s t i ng of the %neri can Arbi t r a t i oi i Associ at i 01 i ; pi ov i • :ied I i :rwe ei t\ iat 
a i i: i 11 a 1: i c i i ' i I I i i :> t b e e x c 11 i s i ve re me d) ; a n d i f t h e p a r t i e s m u s t t "e t a i r i 
attorne ys to resolve sucl i coi ttrovet s y\ the party determined to be at fat j i t 
oi ii i breach shal I pay a 11 reasonable at tor ne " s fees :» I ' tl i E! ::> t l lei p x i 1;; 
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Car repair & maintenance 
VISA 
Gasoline 
Insurance premiums for auto, life & 
Home Owners 
Recreation 
Auto replacement (every 3 years.) 
Child support 
Miscellaneous 
Porfessional expenses & meetings 
Legal expenses 
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INCOME - VAL B. JOHNSON M.D. 
Wages $ 72,000.00 
Bonus 55,000.00 
Estimated gross income $ 127,000.00 
Estimated taxes 
Federal income tax $ 33,750.00 
State income tax 6,750.00 
SocialSecurity 3,000.00 
$ 43,500.00 
Net estimated income (Annually) $ 83,500.00 
Net estimated income (Monthly) $ 6,958.00 
•* 'ISS 
D R A F T \)AAFT 
POLICY STATEMENT 
BACKGROUND 
The Utah Child Support Task Force was created by the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Utah State Judicial Council to examine the present 
procedures for establishing child support awards and to make 
recommendations for the implementation of child support guidelines for 
use in Utah's courts and agencies involved in setting child support. 
Such guidelines were to be developed in compliance with the Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-37; text included in 
Appendix together with its implementing regulations 45 CFR 302.56) 
which conditioned continued federal funding for certain social services 
programs on guideline implementation. 
Task Force members were appointed by Utah Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Gordon Hall and include judges, lawyers, legislators, 
economists, professors and representatives of public interest groups (a 
list of members and positions included in Appendix). The Task Force 
has met regularly since its formation in February 1987, and has 
solicited input from any and all interested persons. Prior to 
formulating guidelines, the Task Force heard testimony from many 
parents at a public hearing in Salt Lake City, and from Invited experts 
including judges and family law lawyers. Task Force members were 
interviewed on television and radio and for newspaper articles which 
resulted in the receipt of many letters from interested persons. 
Written questionnaires were sent to all District Court Judges and 
members of the Utah State Bar Family Law Section. Task Force members 
reviewed child support guidelines previously implemented in many other 
states and read extensive materials on the subject. 
Following the formulation and dissemination of proposed guidelines, 
the Task Force conducted public hearings in Brigham City, Price, Provo, 
Richfield, St. George and Salt Lake City for further comment. Final 
guideline recommendations were presented to the Judicial Council in May 
1988. 
NEED FOR GUIDELINES 
Prior to the passage of the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 
1984, only a few states had implemented child support guidelines. The 
congressional mandate for development of guidelines recognized 
deficiencies in the traditional case-by-case method of determining 
child support awards. Generally, these deficiencies can be described 
as: 1) a shortfall in the adequacy of awards when compared to the 
true costs of rearing children; 2) inconsistent orders resulting in 
inequitable treatment of parties in similarly situated cases; and 3) 
inefficient adjudication of child support awards in the absence of 
uniform standards. 
SHORTFALLS IN LEVELS OF AWARDS 
Recent studies indicate that child support awards are critically 
deficient when measured against the economic costs of child rearing. 
A 1985 study estimated that $26.6 billion in child support would have 
been due in 1984 if awards were based on either of two existing 
alternative guidelines, Delaware's or Wisconsin's.1 By comparison, a 
Census Bureau study indicated $10.1 billion in child support was 
reported to be due in 1983 and $7.1 billion was actually collected.2 
These figures demonstrate that there was a "compliance gap" of $3 
billion in 1983, but an "adequacy gap" of more than $15 billion. 
Further, the most recent U.S. Census Bureau study reported the mean 
court-ordered child support obligation in 1983 to be $191 per month for 
1.7 children.^ One authoritative study indicated an order for $191 
per month is equivalent to only 25% of the average expenditures on 
children in a middle income household.^ Assuming that the expenses 
for children should be borne in proportion to parental income, these 
figures suggest that court-ordered child support levels should be two 
and one-half times higher than the reported levels in 1983. 
Other studies indicate that court ordered support falls far short 
of even the most minimal standards for the costs of raising children. 
Based on the U.S. poverty guideline, the average court order would have 
provided support at only 80% of the poverty level for 1983.5 As the 
poverty guideline represents the lowest acceptable living standard in 
the U.S., court ordered support levels appear to be gravely deficient. 
EQUITY OF CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS 
There is considerable evidence that guidelines can improve the 
equity of child support awards and that unsystematic variation in 
awards persists in the absence of guidelines.^ Testimony presented 
to the Task Force, particularly that by several District Court Judges, 
indicated little consistency among judges in setting support awards, 
even though each judge may demonstrate a high level of consistency in 
his own decisions. 
It is the position of the Task Force that the traditional methods 
of setting child support awards, though having the advantage of 
allowing a case-by-case review of circumstances, can lead to the 
imposition of markedly different child support awards for obligors even 
if they have the same number of children and identical income levels. 
The appearance of inequity created by inconsistent orders inherent in 
the case-by-case approach has resulted in resentment and frustration 
for obligors and obligees alike. Obligors perceptions of inequitable 
treatment also may contribute to existing compliance problems. 
EFFICIENCY OF COURT PROCESSES 
Experience of states with guidelines has shown that they can 
improve the efficiency of adjudication processes for child support 
awards. Guidelines can better facilitate voluntary settlements and 
reduce court or administrative agency time required to resolve those 
cases that are still contested,7 
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The Task Force expects that guidelines will increase settlements as 
they will provide parties with the presumptive amount. Even when the 
case is contested, courts may adjudicate cases more quickly because a 
guideline provides the framework for considering the issue, even if a 
deviation is requested. 
Implementation of guidelines can also facilitate the use of an 
expedited case processing procedure as required by the Child Support 
Enforcement Amendments of 1984. As specified in federal regulations 
(45 CFR 303.101) states must adopt expedited judicial or administrative 
processes to establish and enforce child support awards. Guidelines 
can provide a framework for quasi-judicial and/or administrative 
hearing officers to use in setting amounts of child support awards. 
GUIDELINE OBJECTIVES 
In recognition of the need for, and advantages of, guidelines, the 
Task Force agreed the primary purpose of guidelines is to formulate a 
uniform and equitable method to determine child support. One that is 
predictable, reasonable, simply calculated, and which reflects the duty 
of both parents to support their children commensurate with their 
ability. Toward that end, the Task Force adopted the following 
objectives: 
1. To provide as simple as possible a uniform child support 
guideline to facilitate understanding by the parties and 
efficient administration by the courts. 
2. To provide a uniform, consistent and objective method for 
determining child support obligations to enable parents and 
attorneys to estimate a child support award. 
3. To ensure that inadequate child support doesn't contribute to 
the number of children living below the U.S. Census Bureau's 
poverty threshold level. 
4. To protect children as much as possible from the adverse 
economic consequences of family breakup or non-formation. 
5. To encourage joint parental responsibility by allocating 
support in proportion to each parent's income. 
6. To meet a child's basic needs first, but to the extent either 
parent enjoys a higher than basic standard of living, the 
child is entitled to share in that higher standard of living. 
7. To structure guidelines to accommodate the subsistence needs 
of parents but in all instances to require at least a minimum 
payment toward child support. 
8. To allow parents to rely on the amount of the child support 
obligation so that both parents can plan other parts of their 
lives. 
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9. To provide a standard for reviewing the adequacy of existing 
child support orders. 
10. To provide a method for periodic updating of child support 
orders. 
11. To apply the uniform child support guideline without regard 
for the gender of the custodial parent. 
12. To minimize negative effects on the major life style decisions 
of both parents. The guideline should avoid creating economic 
disincentives for remarriage or labor force participation. 
13. To ensure Utah is in conformity with federal law and therefore 
qualifies for continued federal funding for state and federal 
welfare programs. 
USE OF THE GUIDELINES 
The Task Force identified and considered many individual factors, 
and the relation of each to the other, in formulating the guidelines. 
Many of the factors considered were made an integral part of the 
guidelines, while others were deemed inappropriate for integration in 
the guidelines, but may deserve consideration in a particular case. 
INTEGRATED FACTORS 
Application of the Guidelines 
The guidelines will apply in all cases, not just in those that 
are litigated, including divorce, separation and paternity. 
The guidelines will create a rebuttable presumption and 
require that trial judges enter a specific written finding of 
fact in the event a child support order devLates from the 
guidelines. 
Worksheets explaining the formula applied in the use of the 
guidelines shall be attached to the guidelines. 
Income 
Gross income is used to determine each parent's share of child 
support. Gross income includes income from any source except 
as may be excluded elsewhere in the guidelines, and includes, 
but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, 
commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, dividends, severance 
pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony, annuities, 
capital gains, social security benefits, workman's 
compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, and 
disability insurance benefits. Additionally, business expense 
account payments for items such as meals, automobile expenses 
and lodging, should be included to the extent that they 
provide the recipient parent with something he or she would 
otherwise have to provide. 
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Deductions From Gross Income 
After the amount of gross income is determined, a subsistence 
level for each parent will be deducted. A subsistence level 
will be equal to the federal poverty guidelines for a 
one-person household ($458 per month in 1987). 
Also deducted from gross income will be child support 
previously ordered and actually paid for children of a prior 
relationship. Proof of payment of such child support should 
be required before the deduction is allowed. 
Aid to families with dependent children and other similar 
welfare benefits being received by an obligor parent are not 
to be included as income. Also, benefits received under the 
State Housing Subsidy, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
Medicaid benefits and food stamps, as well as General 
Assistance, should not be included as income. 
Determining Income 
Gross income, whenever possible, should first be computed on 
an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average 
gross monthly income. Suitable documentation of current 
earnings shall be provided and should include year-to-date pay 
stubs and employer statements. Documentation of current 
earnings should be supplemented with copies of at least the 
last three years of tax returns to provide verification of 
earnings over time. Historical earnings will be used to 
determine whether an underemployment or overemployment 
situation exists. 
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business 
is defined as: Gross receipts minus minimum necessary 
expenses required for self-employment or business operation. 
In general, income and expense from self-employment or 
operation of a business should be carefully reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to 
the parent to satisfy a child support award. This amount will 
ordinarily differ from a determination of business income for 
tax purposes. Specifically, only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable level should be 
deducted from gross receipts. 
Imputed Income 
In circumstances where either parent is voluntarily 
underemployed or unemployed, earning capacity should be 
imputed to that parent based upon employment potential and 
probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds and gender in the community. If one parent has 
been absent from the work force for a significant period of 
time, there may be no recent work history to consider. In 
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such cases, income should be imputed at least at the federal 
minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. 
However, income should not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist: 
1. The reasonable costs of day care for the parties' 
minor children approach or equal the amount of income the 
custodial parent can earn; 
2. A parent is physically or mentally disabled to the 
extent where he or she cannot earn minimum wage; 
3. A parent is engaged in education or retraining to 
establish basic job skills; or 
4. If the emotional and physical needs of the child 
require the responsible parent's presence in the home. 
Step-parent Income 
Only the income from the natural parents of the child is used 
to determine support. 
Minimum/Maximum Support Awards 
A minimum child support award will be required in all 
instances. If a parent's annual income is equal to or less 
than $5,500 per year, such parent must pay $25 per month per 
child or ten percent of that parent's monthly gross income, 
whichever amount is greater. 
There will be an upper limit on the amount of child support 
awarded. Not more than fifty percent of the noncustodial 
parent's gross income should be awarded. The guidelines 
[should be used for all incomes up to $10,000 per month. If 
[either parent has income above $10,000 per month, child 
[support should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and some 
|of the child support obligation may be fulfilled in a form 
[other than cashl In no case, however, should the cash amount 
fall below the presumptive level of support set by the 
schedule for a parent earning $10,000 per month. 
Child's Income 
The earnings of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award should not be considered income to either parent for the 
purposes of the guidelines. However, Social Security or Old 
Age Dependents benefits received by a child will be credited 
as child support to the parent whose earning record it is 
based upon. 
Children From A Second Family 
Additional children from second families will not affect the 
support level ordered for the first children. 
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Temporary Changes In Income 
Temporary or reasonably contemplated changes in income should 
not be deemed to be a substantial change of circumstances. (){jiA^t^^vftV0 
Ages of Children 
In recognition of the fact that the costs of rearing children 
differ depending on the age of each child, the guidelines 
apply varying amounts of support for three age groups; 0-6 
years of age, 7-12 years of age, and 12 years of age to 
majority. 
Child Care Costs 
The reasonable costs of child care expenses actually incurred 
should be allocated to each parent in proportion to income. 
The child care expenses considered should include child care 
costs to allow the custodial parent to work, child care costs 
to allow the custodial parent to look for work, and also the 
costs for child care which allow the custodial parent to 
complete education as a prerequisite for obtaining employment. 
Health Insurance/Medical Expenses 
The parent who can obtain the most favorable medical/dental 
and optical insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor 
children at the lowest cost should generally be ordered to do 
so. If economically beneficial to the minor children, both 
parents should be ordered to provide such insurance. The 
costs incurred for the child's portion of the insurance 
premium(s) will be allocated in proportion to income. Those 
non-covered routine medical expenses will be borne by the 
custodial parent. Routine expenses include routine office 
visits, physical examinations and immunizations. 
Extraordinary medical expenses should be allocated to the 
parents in proportion to income. Extraordinary expenses 
include, but are not limited to, surgery, orthodontic care, 
all dental treatment, psychological or psychiatric care, 
hospitalization, physical therapy, opthamology and optometry, 
broken limbs, and continuing illnesses or allergies, such as 
diabetes or asthma. If neither parent has an insurance policy 
for the benefit of the minor children, all medical expenses 
should be shared proportionately. 
Extended Visitation 
In the event a minor child which is the subject of a child 
support award spends at least 25 of 30 consecutive days, 
including overnight, with the noncustodial parent, said 
parent's child support obligation should be offset by 25% for 
that month. 
&£i 
FACTORS NOT INTEGRATED 
Visitation 
Despite the fact that 
to the formulation of 
uniform child support 
he Task Force was limited 
o facilitate reasonable and 
individuals expressed 
extreme concern about problemsy&ith child visitation. Some 
parents addressing the Task F^rceVfelt that visitation should 
not be allowed unless child/suppork payments are current, 
while others believe child^support payments should not be 
required unless visitation is effected. 
It is the position of the Task Force that every child has the 
right to be financially supported and physically and 
emotionally nurtured by both parents. The Task Force 
recognizes the anguish experienced by parents who have not 
been allowed to develop and maintain a meaningful relationship 
with their children. However, to link the two in the 
guidelines would be contrary to Utah case law and beyond 
purview of the Task Force. 
Additionally, the Task Force felt that any travel expenses 
incurred by either parent as necessary to effect child 
visitation should not be integrated in the guidelines but 





The guidelines do not address the question of which parent is 
permitted to claim dependent children as tax exemptions. 
Since tax exemptions have a value and affect the parties' 
available resources, consideration must be given to which of 
the parties will receive this benefit when setting child 
support. However, because tax laws are subject to change and 
because the IRS is the final arbitrator in deciding which 
party will receive the tax exemption, it was deemed 
inappropriate to attempt to include such consideration in £he 
guidelines. ££ ^ syitU pLt^LAj^CLsJC<x* ^J^^CUA^LAC. C4U^ 
Split/Shared Custody 
The guidelines will not apply in cases of split or shared 
(joint) physical custody. Rather, these situations should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Shared or joint custody 
is typified by a child residing with both parents on a 50-50 
basis. Split custody refers to the situation where each 
parent is ordered physical custody of at least one child born 
of the relationship. The Task Force has concluded that it 
costs more to rear children under either type of arrangement 
since two households (including personal items and 
transportation) must be maintained. Generally, an amount 
equal to 50 percent of the support award as determined by 
using the guidelines should be added to determine the total 
costs of support necessary in such situations. (Example 
included in Appendix) 
AMstLnd 
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Updating Avards 
Child support orders should be updated regularly and, to 
facilitate updating, the parties should be ordered in the 
original decree to exchange financial information every two 
years. Ideally, child support awards would be automatically 
updated every two years by applying current financial 
information to the guidelines. 
However, the Task Force recognizes that a mechanism for 
systematic updating does not presently exist and that the 
existing judicial structure could not accommodate the extreme 
increase in case filings given current case loads. Therefore, 
it is recommended that an administrative agency be created to 
devise, implement and administer a system for regular and 
reasonable updating of child support awards. 
Impact on Extant Child Support Awards 
In the event application of the present guidelines would 
increase or decrease an existing child support award by 20 
percent or more, such variation should constitute a 
substantial change of circumstances such that the court could 




Assuming that there is one child; that parent number one has a 
gross income of $2,200 per month and a net income of $900 per month; 
that parent number two has a gross income of $1,527 per month and net 
income of $762 per month. These parent's total child support 
obligation would be $430 per month (obtained by multiplying their gross 
amount of income by 18.8). An additional 50 percent is necessary to 
maintain these two households, or $430 times 50% = $215. $430 + $215 = 
$645. Therefore, $645 would be the total amount of child support in 
these or shared custody arrangement. Such a figure is 28% of the total 
combined family income, making parent number one's share and support 
28% of $1,527 or $427; and parent number two's share of support 28% of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, 
Defendant. ] 
I MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 Case No. 94737 
D e f e n s e c o u n s e l i s i n v i t e d t o submit f i n d i n g s , 
c o n c l u s i o n s , and decree c o n s i s t e n t with tha t i n d i c a t e d below. If 
he has not done so wi th in two weeks a f t e r r e c e i p t of t h i s 
d e c i s i o n , p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel i s i n v i t e d t o do so . 
FACTS 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the case because of 
the residency of both parties in Weber County. 
2. The parties were married in 1966, and separated in 
1986. Each party is now requesting a divorce. 
3* Each party has been cruel to the other. The 
plaintiff's cruelty is that she did not make a reasonable effort 
to keep the romance alive. She gave priority to her church work, 
children, and personal interests. This caused her husband to 
feel isolated and unappreciated. She attempted marriage 
counseling about five years ago. Her husband attempted to revive 
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this counseling in 1985f but the plaintiff took no interest in 
that effort. Defendant's solution to his problem is legally 
unacceptable. He developed a secret romance. The plaintiff 
eventually discovered the romance and filed for separate mainten-
ance. He counterclaimed for divorce. She has a desire to 
continue the marriage, but does not plan any personal behavior 
changes towards her husband. He now plans to continue with his 
new romance. The Court's conclusion is that each of the parties 
are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty. If 
the parties agree, the divorce may be final at once. 
4. The Court accepts the parties1 stipulation so far as 
it goes, concerning child custody, visitation, and property 
division, etc., and rules on the remaining issues. If any issue 
is not here ruled on, or further guidance is needed, the Court is 
available for conference. 
5. The parties1 stipulation reserves the issue of child 
support. The Court finds that the following of the child support 
table's last line, that is for approximately $120,000 per year, 
is proper. The Court recognizes that the father's earnings 
likely exceed that figure by $10,000 to $25,000 per year. The 
exact income is deemed by the Court to be immaterial. The 
Court's reasoning on this matter is set out below. 
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This Judge wrote the first child support guidelines in 
Utah. He also served on the Utah Judicial Council when the first 
statewide guidelines were adopted. The issue of how high child 
support guidelines should go is a matter of considerable debate. 
It may be helpful to examine a somewhat similar case. That case 
concerns a multi-millionaire's divorce in Clearfield, Utah. The 
children were left with the mother in the family home, and 
everyone planned the children would remain in the public schools 
and continue to enjoy their friends and association in the middle 
class neighborhood. This is very similar to the case at hand. 
The calculations begin with the consideration of foodstuffs. 
Milk, eggs, bread and vegetables, etc., cost a rich child close 
to the same as it costs a middle class child. A rich child, by 
and large, wears the same fashions as his peers. The recreation 
is principally shared with persons of his own age group. There 
are some trips expected that will be taken with grandparents, 
father, and occasionally with the mother, that may be considered 
more exotic. Doctors and dentists charge rich children and 
middle class children a fixed rate. The bottom line, arithmatic-
ally, was that once a child's father gets to the $10,000 a month 
level, and a child is raised locally, there is no effect on sums 
spent actually rearing the child when the father's income 
increases. One runs into a problem similar to "Brewster's 
Millions". The Davis County millionaire was the product of 
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generations of rich menf and their efforts to adjust. He 
concluded that to give a child more than one and one-half times 
the neighboring kids' allowance is to buy your child problems. 
An analysis of the monthly budget of this couple while they lived 
together/ and since the separation/ supports the hypothesis that 
prudence does not indicate that anymore should be spent on child 
support in the future than was spent on child care while the 
father lived at the home. This couple actually spent less while 
the father lived in the home than is indicated in the child 
support^ guidelines in the tables. It is not the purpose of child 
support to provide savings and/or estates. Savings and estates 
are matters that are controlled by the parents and involve other 
considerations. 
6. The parties did not stipulate on whether or not the 
house should be paid off. The plaintiff should be allowed to 
chose whether to take the cash and the obligation and/or pay off 
the mortgage. There is sufficient equity in the home that there 
is little risk to the defendant. The subject of alimony is not 
covered by the stipulation/ nor is the value of the medical 
doctor degree/ nor the value of the defendant's position in the 
professional corporation. A 
' The plaintiff is awarded alimony at the rate of $lf000 
** to be continued under the general terms of aiimonyf but not to 
exceed ten years. The Court's rationale in ruling on this matter 
is indicated below. 
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The plaintiff has enjoyed the benefits of this medical 
degree for a substantial period of the time. 
The plaintiff did not create this degree. Her contribu-
tion was a very limited financial one for three years and a few 
months that she worked at I.R. S. She earned about $14,000 during 
that time and shared it with the defendant. The defendant was 
well on his way to the medical degree before this marriage. He 
had achieved his undergraduate education and the degree that made 
his acceptance into medical school possible. He had been 
accepted into medical school. He had already completed one year 
before the marriage. He had the support of his parents. His 
parents continued to pay all of his tuition and book charges 
until the degree was obtained. He had a limited fellowship. He 
worked part time for two of the three years the couple lived 
together during medical school. The evidence indicates that the 
defendant would have achieved a medical degree with or without 
the plaintifffs limited financial contribution^ She married a 
medical student. She will further enjoy the fruits of his study 
in the future. She has received substantial sums of money that 
his training has provided in the property settlement. The child 
support here awarded reflects his higher earning capacity. 
7. The stipulation does not cover attorneys' fees or 
the cost of expert witnesses. Each party shall bear their own 
expenses in this matter. 
Page 6 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 94737 
Much of the trial time has been concerned with the 
plaintiff1s allegation of the present value of the medical degree 
and the stock exceeds a million dollars and that he should pay 
her one-half. The plaintiff's expert witness1 testimony as to 
the value of the medical degree and/or the stock lacks 
credibility. 
First let us be concerned with the value of the stock 
position in the professional corporation. There is no fixed 
contract for employment with the hospitals. It is a "going rate" 
situation. Each doctor does equal work and gets equal pay 
regardless of the number of years he has spend with the group. 
The articles of incorporation are actually little more than a 
partnership at will. The buy out agreement fixes the buy out 
figure as a porportional share of the fixed assets. Each doctor 
bills the hospital for each servicer and the money is eventually 
split equally. One of the principal benefits of the business is 
the arrangement makes impossible for the corporation to pay into 
a retirement fund sums that, in effect, defer taxation. This 
accumulation of funds for the purpose of division in this case 
shall be calculated as of the value indicated by the defendants 
experts as of April 1, 1987. Both the plaintiff and the defen-
dant must bear their own tax consequences from any draw from 
these sums. The value of these deferred earnings is as indicated 
by the defendant's experts. The market place has provided 
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subs t i tu te or new doctors. The new doctors come in substant ia l ly 
in the same pos i t ion as the leaving doctors. This i s true of the 
manner in which t h i s defendant was treated. There i s no indica-
t ion in the immediate future that the earnings of these doctors 
w i l l exceed the simple value of a pa tho log i s t ' s services on a 
piecemeal basis to the hospi ta l s . 
8. The value of the p l a i n t i f f ' s exper t w i t n e s s 
testimony as to the worth of the M. D. degree i s not credible . 
One of his flaws i s the assumption that a doctor's income w i l l 
increase each year by a fixed percentage. The basic income of 
t h i s group i s on the formula that cash received w i l l equal the 
normal charges for piece work done by the pathologist at the 
various h o s p i t a l ' s d irect ions . Unless the rate charged for the 
piecemeal service i s increased, and there i s no evidence that i t 
w i l l be, in fact evidence i s that i t w i l l l e s s e n , or the amount 
of piece work increases , and there i s no evidence that i t w i l l , 
or the number of doctors sharing the funds wi l l decrease, and 
there i s no evidence that suggests t h i s , the earnings have 
l e v e l e d off at the present rate for the expected future. Each 
one of the pathologis ts charges rates ident ica l t o the others , 
and there i s no spec i f i c reward for sen ior i ty or length of 
s erv ice . The income of these pathologis ts i s expected to be set 
by the f a i r market place in the future. The defendant's 
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accountant has high credibilityr the plaintiff1 s expert is not 
credible. There is no reason the defendant should pay the 
plaintiff's experts. 
9. Each party has funds from which they may pay their 
own attorney. The Court finds that each of the parties have 
employed their attorney and relied upon their attorney in good 
faith. Each party will bear their own attorney's fees. 
10. The value of the professional corporation stock is 
as indicated by the defendant's accountant. 
11. The Court has considered the defendant's contention 
that the plaintiff should be forced to either find employment or 
charged as though she were working. It is recognized that, in 
this day and age, it is rare to see a 44 year old woman, in good 
healthf with a college degreef who has no serious plans for 
employment. The Court is also aware of the fact that she does 
have an 8 vear old child at home. She should be encouraged to 
work eventually. She is not to be considered to have changed the 
circumstances if she finds employmentr so long as the earnings do 
not exceed $lf300 or $1,400 per month. 
DATED this Ql day of March, 1987. 
JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, Judge 
TIM W. HEALY, #7606 
Attorney for Defendant 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2630 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, 3 
Defendant. , 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94737 
The above entitled matter came before the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding for trial on 
the 20th day of March 1987 and again on the 23rd day of March 
1987; plaintiff was present represented by her counsel, Stephen 
W. Farr, Esq; defendant was present represented by his 
counsel, Tim W. Healy, Esq, A stipulation of the parties 
regarding the division of real and personal property was 
read and acknowledged by the parties* Various witnesses 
were sworn and testified and various items of documentary 
evidence were received. Counsel for the respective parties 
met again with the Court on April 22, 1987 for the purpose 
of clarifying some items from the Memorandum Decision 
and the Court being duly advised in the premises now 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in this matter inasmuch 
as both parties are actual and bona fide residents of 
Weber County, Utah. 
2. That the parties were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah on August 19, 1966. They separated on or about 
February 1, 1986. Each party is now requesting a divorce. 
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3. That three children have been born as issue of 
the marriage, to-wit: Erik Val Johnson, born October 30, 
1970; Jennifer Johnson, born January 22, 1973 and Jamie Anne 
Johnson, born November 30, 1978. 
4. That both parties have caused the other party pain 
and anguish to such an extent that they are unable to continue 
in the marital relationship with the other. Plaintiff's 
cruelty was that she did not make a reasonable effort to 
keep the romance alive and she gave priority to her church 
work, children and personal interests and has caused her 
husband, the defendant, to feel isolated and unappreciated 
5. Plaintiff attempted marriage counselling approximately 
five years ago. Defendant attempted to revive this counselling 
in 1985 but plaintiff took no interest in that effort. 
6. Defendant's cruelty consisted of havinq developed a 
secret remance which plaintiff eventually discovered and she 
filed for separate maintenance. Defendant counterclaimed for 
divorce. Plaintiff has expressed a desire to continue the 
marriage but does not plan any personal behavioral changes 
toward the defendant. Plaintiff testified that defendant 
plans to continue his relationship with another woman. 
7. Plaijitj.ff did obtain a college degree in business from 
Weber State College prior to her marriage to defendant. 
8. That at the time of the marriage of the parties, defendant 
had obtained his bachelor's degree and had completed one 
year of medical school. 
9. That plaintiff worked for approximately three years 
following the marriage of the parties but has not worked in tho 
ensuing 17 years. Defendant also worked part-time for 
two of the three years he was in medical school after the 
parties were married. 
10. That defendant's parents paid all of the expenses 
for defendant's tuition and books during the time that he was 
in medical school. 
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11. That defendant had a limited fellowship during 
medical school which was a credit upon his tuition costs. 
12. That defendant would have achieved a medical ( -)w 
degree with or without the plaintiff's limited contribution. 
13. That plaintiff has enjoyed the benefits and 
fruits of defendant's medical degree for a substantial 
period of time. 
13. That the articles of incorporation of defendant's 
employer, The Associates of Pathology, are actually little 
more than a partnership at will. 
14. That the buy-out agreement fixed the buy-out figure 
as a proportional share of fixed assets. 
15. That there is no fixed contract of employment 
with the hospitals served by the aforesaid corporation; it is 
a going rate situation. 
16. That each doctor within the aforesaid professional 
corporation bills the hospital and/or the other clients 
for services rendered and the money is eventually divided 
equally. 
17. That the jnarket place has provided substitute or 
new doctors. New doctors come in substantially in the 
same position as the doctors leaving said corporation. The 
rates charged by each pathologist are identical to the 
others and there is no specific reward for seniority or length 
of service. 
18. That the value of defendant's interest in the 
Associates of Pathology , a professional corporation, is 
$14,521.00. 
19. That one of the flaws in plaintiff's calculation of 
the value of defendant's medical degree is the assumption 
that the defendant's income would increase each year by a 
fixed percentage. 
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20. That the basic income of defendant in his employment 
with the Associates of Pathology will equal the normal charges 
for piece work done by the pathologist at the direction of the 
various hospitals and other clients. There is no evidence 
that the___paY___j£gr- this piecemeal, service _wil I increase; in 
fact, the evidence _isJthat__it__wi 1^1 lessen. There is also 
no evidence that the amount of piece work will increase or 
that the number o«f doctors sharing the earnings from 
the Associates of Pathology will decrease. 
21. That the earnings of the defendant has levelledM^ff 
at the present rate for the expected future. The pm-i^nted 
income for the defendant for 1987 including salary and 
bonus is between $127,000 and $132,000 which income level 
is expected to remain constant in the ensuing few years. 
22. That the income of the defendant as well as the 
other pathologists within the Associates of Pathology is 
expected to be set by the fair market place in the future. 
The rates charged by each pathologist are identical to the 
others and there is no specific reward for seniority or length 
of service. 
23. That the earnings of the defendant as well as 
his future potential have been considered by the Court for the 
purpose of fixing alimony. 
24. That each of the parties have employed their 
attorney and relied upon said attorney in good faith. 
25. That each party has funds with which they may pay their 
own attorney. 
26. That the parties have acquired substantial real 
and personal property during the course of their marriage 
which should be equitably divided pursuant to the stipulation 
of the parties. 
27. That the maximum/rigure used for child support 
pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Schedule of $10,000 per 
•¥• 
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month recognizes that even though a father's income may be 
higher the cost of raising and supporting said children locally \^ 
will not increase although the father's income may exceed the 
$10,000 per month figure. 
28. That plaintiff and defendant actually spent less 
while defendant lived in the home for the support of the \£> 
children of the parties than is indicated in the child 
support guidelines and the tables adopted by this judicial 
district based upon defendant's income. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff and defendant should each be awarded 
a decree of divorce from the other upon the grounds of 
mental cruelty the same to become final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. That plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties subject to 
reasonable rights of visitation by defendant. 
3. That defendant should pay to plaintiff as and for 
child supportXhe sum of $648.00 per month per child commencing 
with the month of April 1987. 
4. That plaintiff's expert witnesses lack credibility 
interest and . ^ f L1 
regarding the values placed on defendant's/stock with the 
Associates of Pathology and regarding the value of his 
medical degree. 
5. That defendant's expert witness has high credibility 
regarding the value of defendant's interest and stock in the 
Associates of Pathology as well as his earnings as a 
medical doctor. 
6. That defendant's medicaj^dggree should not be marital 
property subject to division by the Court in a divorce action. 
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7. That defendant's earnings as well as his future potential 
have been considered by the Court for the purpose of fixing 
alimony. 
8. That defendant should pay to plaintiff as and for 
alTmohy)the sum of $1,000 per month commencing with the 
~Tff5ftth of April 1987. Said alimony should be paid to 
plaintiff for a period of ten years or until plaintiff either 
remarries, cohabits with another male person or dies. 
9. That plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the value 
in defendant's interest in_ the Associates of Pathology, 
a professional corporation which total interest is in the sum 
of $14,521.00. 
10. That plaintiff should be awarded the family home of 
the parties subject to assuming and discharging the outstanding 
mortgage balance thereon and holding the defendant harmless there-
from. 
11. That defendant should be entitled to claim the 
two oldest children of the parties for income tax purposes 
— v. 
commencing in 1986. At such time as the oldest child of 
the parties reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school 
with his appropriate year group, whichever is later, that child 
support should be discontinued. Defendant should then be 
entitled to claim the^oldest child of the parties for income 
tax purposes. At such time as just one child remains the 
defendant should be entitled to claim said child for income 
tax purposes every other year. 
12. That each of the parties should bear the expenses 
of their own expert witnesses as well as their own^attorney 
Tee&) and costs. 
13. That plaintiff should notbe entitled to any 
portion of defendant's 1986 or 1987 bonus inasmuch as these are 
considered as part of defendant's overall annual income, provided, 
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16• That the accumulated amounts in the pension & 
£rg>fJLt_gharlng trusts for purposes of property division 
should be as of April 1, 1987, Both the plaintiff and the 
defendant should bear their own tax consequences from any 
draw from these sums. 
17 . That the remaining items of personal property 
including but not limited to silverware, china and porcelain 
should be divided equally, traded against other items of 
similar value or purchased for cash for the value of the 
other party's interests. 
18. That the defendant should receive the photo 
equipment, the snow blower and the stereo. 
19. That the plaintiff should be awarded the sewing 
machines, ATV 3 wheeler and the parties should also 
divide the Lennox china and the Lunt silverware or one 
party may buy out the other party for one-half of the said 
value. 
20. That the parties should sign such Quit Claim 
Deeds to real property as well as vehicle titles as may 
be required to effect transfer of the aforesaid real and 
personal property. 
21. That any amounts in the savings and checking 
accounts as well as ±ocks and bonds in excess of the amounts 
as shown in paragraph 15 above should be equally divided. 
22/ That plaintiff's circumstances should not be 
considered to have changed for purposes of modifying <j^ 
alimony awarded herein so long as her earnings do not 
exceed $1400 per month. , , 
TIM W. HEALY #7606 
Attorney for Defendant 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2630 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,'STATE OF UTJ 
JANET SUE JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS. ' 
VAL BUDGE JOHNSON, 
Defendant. ] 
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The above entitled matter came before the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, District Judge presiding,for trial 
on the 20th day of March, 1987 and again on the 23rd day of 
March, 1987; plaintiff was present represented by her counsel, 
Stephen W, Farr, Esq? defendant was present represented by 
his counsel, Tim W. Healy, Esq. A stipulation of the parties 
regarding the division of real and personal property was 
read and acknowledged by the parties* Various witnesses 
were sworn and testified and various items of documentary 
evidence were received. Counsel for the respective parties 
met again with the Court on April 22, 1987 for the 
purpose pf clarifying some items from the Memorandum Decision 
and the Court being duly advised in the premises and having 
filed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in writing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff and defendant shall each be 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds 
of mental cruelty the same to become final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. That the plaintiff shall be awarded the care, custody 
snd control of the minor children of the parties subject to 
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reasonable rights of visitation by defendant, 
3. That defendant shall pay to plaintiff as and for, 
child support)the sum of $648.00 per month per child V ^ 
commencing with the month of April 1987. * ! 
4. That defendant's medical degree is not marital 
property subject to division by the Court in a divorce 
action. 
5. That defendant's earnings as well as his future 
potential have been considered by the court for the purpose 
of fixing alimony. 
6. That defendant shall pay to plaintiff as and for 
alimony/the sum of $1,000 per month commencing with the 
month of April 1987. Said alimony shall be paid to plaintiff 
for a period of ten years or until plaintiff either remarries, 
cohabits or dies. 
7. That plaintiff shall be awarded one-half of the 
value in defendant's interest in the Associates of Pathology, 
a professional corporation, which total interest is in the 
sum of $14,521.00. 
8. That plaintiff shall be awarded the family home of 
the parties subject to assuming and discharging the 
outstanding mortgage balance thereon and holding the 
defendant harmless therefrom. 
9. That defendant shall be entitled to claim the 
*-..~ -Mocf children of the parties for income tax purposes 
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commencing in 1986. At such time as the oldest child of 
the parties reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high 
school with his appropriate year group, whichever is later, 
that child support shall be discontinued. Defendant shall the 
be entitled to claim the next oldest child of the parties 
for income tax purposes. At such time as just one child 
remains the defendant shall be entitled to claim said 
child for income tax purposes every other year. 
10. That each of the parties shall bear the expenses 
of their own expert witnesses as well as their own attorney 
fees and costs. 
ll.. That plaintiff shall not be entitled to any 
portion of defendant's 1986 or 1987 bonus inasmuch as these 
are considered as part of defendant/s overall annual income, 
provided, however, that such portions of defendants 1986 
bonus as were previously allocated to the various savings 
and checking accounts of the parties and formed part of the 
stipulation of the parties shall not be affected. 
12. That defendant shall be responsible for any and 
all federal and state income taxes owed by him upon his 
1986 income. 
11. That the parties shall be awarded the following 
real and personal property with the values as indicated 
herein: 
PLAINTIFF:
 L ^ 




Boat 11,000 .>>V" 
Furniture 12,000 \^
 t QV 
h cash incl $17,000 in
 x ~^ £>>N q^ 
Amer. 1st 59,602 ; /'• 
h stock 18,644 L ' ' 
Addt'l cash in lieu of 
AofP stock & life Ins. 9,309 
Share of pension trust 200^950 
. w 
428,505 
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DEFENDANT: 
Share of cash 
Jj stock 
FFCA-EF Hutton 
South Gate Lodge 
A of P stock 
Life ins. cash value 
Loan to Dean 
Muni bonds MLPF&S & 
EF Hutton 
Car 











,  including $20,000 in Continental 
!8 ,644 Mnk checking 
428,504 
14. That the accumulated amounts in the pension and 
profit sharing trusts for purposes of property division 
shall be as of April 1, 1987. 
15. That the remaining items of personal property including 
f limited tq .. , . . L. , , i -»• , :, 
but not/silverware, china and porcelain shall be divided 
equally, traded against other items of similar value or 
purchased for cash for the value of the other party's 
interests. 
16. That the defendant shall receive the photo equipment, 
the snow blower and stereo. 
17. .That the plaintiff shall be awarded the sewing 
machines, ATV 3 wheeler and the parties shall also dj.jn.de 
the Lennox china and the Lunt silverware or one party may 
buy out the other party for one-half of said value. 
18 . That the parties shall sign such Quit Claim Deeds 
to real property as well as vehicle titles as may be 
required to effect transfer of the aforesaid real and 
personal property. 
19. Any amounts in the savings and checking accounts 
as well as stocks and bonds in excess of the amounts as 
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The following values are approximate although the cash will 
be equally divided. 
STOCKS: 
Continental Bank checking 






















Award to plaintiff as si 
of assets 
** Pay off mortqage out of cash, leaving $85,204 in 
available cash to be divided. 
Bear Lake Cabin - our 1/3 value - $10,000. This should qo to 
plaintiff since the other owners are members of her family 
and since it was built at the request of her father who 
asked defendant to help fund it. 
1985 Chevrolet Astro Van 
1987 Chevrolet Spectrum 







** Defendant does nob know tho equity in the Chevy 
Spectrum or how it was paid for. 
Insured Income Properties (FFCA) E. F. Button $10,000 





SOUTH GATE LODGE (Not liquid) 
ASSOCIATES OF PATHOLOGY STOCK 







Cash value of $4,099 
Page -2-
A OF P PENSION PLAN $405,000 
LOAN TO DEAN JOHNSON $ 900 
HOME FURNISHINGS $ 12,000 - plaintiff 
TOTAL ASSETS $857,008 
PETERSON v s . PETERSON 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The court has not directed defendant to 
sell the family home, but it is highly 
unlikely that she will be able to keep it 
as a residence short of contracting a new 
marriage, but at least that decision is up 
to the defendant. (quoting from page 4 
of the Memorandum Decision) 
Having noted the fui.n cial problems, the court failed to 
work ,11 'j'unl tin1 problem and by its decision has in fact exacer-
bated the same. Respondent's payment on the first mortgage on 
the $331,000 home i ,bQ0 per montfo. Appellant recognizes that 
the purpose of alimony is to provide support for a wife as stated 
in the foregoing cases, with t the purpose is not to 
inflict pur ; images, however. With the expensive home and 
large payment, together with the approximately ^600 in main-
tenance, utilities, and upkeep, it is clear that the court's 
attempt to leave the respondent the decision with respect to the 
house is entirely unworkable in view of iiiie financial realities 
in this case. 
If the court ordered the home sold, the parties have 
agreed that there would approximately $150,000 in equity, with 
which respondent could purchase a smaller, affordable home. 
Further, respondent did not work during the 18-raonth period of 
separation prior to the divorce trial which in part is under-
standabl iew of the time that she has been out of the work 
force. However, as found r-- • ne court, she has the capacityto^ 
earn, and appellan *r- earning capacity should be 
considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the court's award. 
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